Europe has agreed on a seven-part negotiating team. Questions have been raised about whether this arrangement strengthens Europe’s leverage or exposes the EU’s inability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor. But what does “Europe” mean? And to what extent does Europe have the capacity to engage constructively in negotiations?
Heikki Patomäki is Professor of World Politics and Global Political Economy at the University of Helsinki

Friedrich Merz, Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron and Petteri Orpo, from left, in Dublin, where EU leaders agreed on a European team for Ukraine peace talks / Photo: European Union
If Europe meant the EU, then an obvious alternative to the current arrangement would have been for the EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, to represent the EU. A problem with this solution is that Kallas is a hardliner whom the Russians would hardly have accepted at the negotiating table, and even if they had, she would probably have helped block the negotiations with her black-and-white world-view. However, there were also institutional struggles inside the EU about who should represent it. Perhaps even more crucial has been the definition of Europe. The central criterion of inclusion seems to have been political and military weight rather than EU membership; thus, the UK is included. The EU itself is only one of seven parties in the team, which also includes the North Atlantic military alliance, NATO. In the end, Kallas received little support and was left out of the negotiating team.
The EU is a hybrid organisation, and hopes for stronger common institutions have been dashed time and again. During the euro crisis, there was a return to intergovernmentalism, and Germany played a key role in this. In the current context, too, Germany has expressed its intention not to give up its place at the negotiating table in favour of common institutions. Other member states have also expressed concerns that their concerns might be ignored if they were left out of the negotiations. However, the end result is not just a victory for intergovernmentalism. Rather, the EU has now emerged as just a party in a militarily defined “Europe”. From the perspective of the democratic all-affected principle, a certain degree of pluralism could well be justified, but the composition of the newly formed negotiating team reflects not democratic principles but the dominance of military thinking.
How will the peace process proceed?
The latest round of negotiations took place in Abu Dhabi between Russian and Ukrainian officials and with US mediators. After the Abu Dhabi talks, US envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff first met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow and then with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv.
Who is expected to meet whom next remains somewhat unclear. Main discussions have mainly been held at a technical level (among national security advisers and the like), and by all accounts, “Europe” will initially be involved in precisely such technical discussions. The Kremlin seems to have conditionally accepted European participation, though the precise format of the negotiations still appears unsettled. There is no agreement on the format or agenda. European leaders mainly want negotiations to focus on a ceasefire, security guarantees for Ukraine, implementation, and reconstruction, whereas the Kremlin wants to focus on the broader European security framework involving the possibility of reversing NATO enlargement.
The question is whether to get the peace process started at all. If one party assumes that the goal of the negotiations is only to bend the other party to its will without any readiness to revise interpretations or make concessions, then that means continuing the war. Just agreeing on an agenda would seem to require concessions from all parties. It is clear that the negotiations cannot ignore the current situation in Ukraine (ending the senseless devastation and war) and the future (the fate of the regions and reconstruction), but they are unlikely to even get started unless the agenda also includes broader issues of European and global security.
It seems that, at the moment, interpretations are locked into what prevailed in 2021-22. In particular, NATO enlargement involves two conflicting OSCE principles. The 1990 Paris Charter and the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration and other documents present two ideas side by side: 1. indivisible or common security (states must not strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of others) and 2. free choice of alliances (every state has the sovereign right to choose or change its security arrangements, including alliances). In 2021-2022, the parties were arguing less about facts than about which OSCE principle should take priority when they cannot be fully implemented simultaneously. This is a deeply political and normative question, not just a legal one. The OSCE concept of common security was not intended to give anyone a veto or create a sphere of interest, but it also does not allow a mindset in which others’ security concerns can be ignored simply by invoking an absolutist legal principle.
Russia may selectively appeal to OSCE principles through its own narrowly defined national interest, but it is also invoking a principle that is more emancipatory than the mere declaration of a sovereign state’s freedom. Invoking this concept means that security can no longer be consistently justified solely by classical sovereignty or force. It means commitment to a principle whose logical consequences can extend much further than the invoker himself or herself means. Historical actors pursue their own, often quite particularistic, goals, but at the same time they become the promoters of some more general historical development that they themselves do not fully control or even understand.
Where is the European peace project?
The original justification for European integration was based on the pursuit of peace. After the world wars and other disasters, cooperation and common institutions were needed to prevent new wars. Instead of great, abstract peace declarations, the project was ultimately advanced step by step through concrete cooperation. What is essential, however, is that European integration has been based on a few major principles. Shared values and the rule of law have been essential parts of the process, but equally important have been the ideas of overcoming the logic of selfish, sovereign states and governing interdependence for the common good.
These ideas seem compatible with the OSCE concept of “collective security” but are in tension with the current emphasis on the absoluteness of sovereign freedom. The EU, loyal to its own peace project, would not treat the principle of sovereign freedom to ally or arm as an absolute norm, nor seek to become an actor like other great powers, but would promote integration around common institutions, even when it is only one party to their activities.
Over time, a variety of new global institutional arrangements may evolve. In the current world-historical conjuncture, however, this means the EU should make every effort to revitalise the OSCE and the UN system. The EU should be prepared to discuss interpreting the NATO issue through the OSCE’s concept of “collective security”. It should be open to at least some concessions that dialogue, the peace process, and the gradual building of cooperation require. From the UN, the EU could adopt, for example, the idea of a temporary international administration, which could be applied to at least some of the disputed areas and regions.
In sum, the EU should engage in a higher level of reflexivity and consider what its project of peace and welfare could mean in the 21st-century world where the EU is just one actor among many, and where no one can build a more functioning world system by dictating their – perhaps misconceived – principles, demands, and ambitions onto others. The problem is that a “Europe” that includes Britain and NATO is unlikely to be ready to negotiate the justification or reasonableness of NATO expansion. This forever war is thus prone to continue.
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