James W. Carden – Yalta 2.0? Please.

Lazy and ahistorical Yalta analogies fall wide of the mark

James W. Carden is a columnist and former adviser to the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission at the U.S. Department of State

Cross-posted from The Realist Review

Over the past week, pundit after pundit has taken to the airwaves to condemn President Trump’s parley with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping as the second coming of Yalta—not that many (or any) of said pundits understand what actually went on at the World War II conference between Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill at the Crimean resort town in February 1945. Thanks to a decades-long PR campaign coordinated by what I, in other contexts, have called the Captive Nations Lobby, Yalta has been reduced to a kind of shorthand, alongside the evergreen “Munich,” for appeasement, but of Stalin rather than Hitler.

The charge falls wide of the mark, not least because Trump has nowhere near the diplomatic savvy of Roosevelt, and Putin, for all his sins (real and alleged), is nowhere near the criminal Stalin was; which to say nothing of the difference in the stakes involved. Yalta, and the previous Allied Conference in Tehran in November 1943, set the military strategy that would bring the greatest (i.e. most awful) war in history to a close; the sideline meet-up at the APEC conference between Putin, Xi, and Trump represents nothing of the sort, as the matter of which country governs the Donbas, despite what the aforementioned Captive Nations Lobby and its friends in the US media claim, is a matter of significantly less import.

Still more, the Yalta of history differs vastly from the Yalta of popular lore. Pundits and pop-historians would have us believe that the Trump-Xi-Putin trilateral will likely set the stage for the final “sell-out” of Ukraine, which has been propped up by the US and Western European governments for the past 5 years to the tune of nearly half a trillion dollars.* The implication is that at Yalta, Roosevelt sold out Poland to Stalin and we are about to see a repeat performance in Shenzhen.

Yet the idea that Yalta represented any kind of “sell-out” is deeply, irredeemably mistaken and represents one of the most intractable myths of the Cold War era.

It is a myth that retains its currency, particularly among neoconservatives and members of the Democratic establishment and media.

In a speech he gave in Riga, Latvia, in 2005 President George W. Bush, who might have been surprised to learn that the Latvians most assuredly did not fight alongside the Allies during the Second World War, compared the agreement reached at Yalta to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, calling it “one of the greatest wrongs of history.”

Likely unbeknownst to Bush and his neoconservative speechwriters such as the invincibly ignorant Michael Gerson, were the summit’s achievements, including an agreement on the makeup of the UN Security Council; an agreement over the makeup of the Allied Control Commission that was being set up to oversee postwar Germany; and, most importantly from Roosevelt’s perspective, Stalin’s agreement to enter the war against Japan once victory was declared over Nazi Germany.

The legendary American diplomat Charles ‘Chip’ Bohlen, who was at Yalta during the negotiations over Poland, remembers, “When Roosevelt said he wanted the Polish election to be pure, like Caesar’s wife.” Stalin replied, “They said that about her but, in fact, she had her sins.” The sin to which Stalin was likely referring was the ten-year non-aggression pact the fascist government of interwar Poland signed with Nazi Germany in 1934–fully 5 years before the Soviets, in a bid to buy time, signed their own non-aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany. Looking back, Bohlen, who took issue with the idea that Poland was ‘sold out’ at Yalta, noted that at the time, “The frontiers of the new Poland, although not what we wanted, did not present a difficult problem. Churchill and Stalin had pretty much settled the issue at Tehran. [Emphasis mine]. The President did attempt to get Lvov [now Ukrainian Lviv] and the adjacent oil fields returned to Poland, but Stalin refused.”

Accounts of the Yalta conference indicate that Churchill had pangs of regret about his earlier agreement with Stalin and “pleaded with Stalin to be magnanimous, to accept a solution that would leave Poland independent.” Stalin responded that while he understood Poland was a point of honor for the British, for the Soviet Union, Poland was a “question of life and death, as well as honor, because in thirty years it had twice served as an invasion corridor.”

By April 1945, both General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, and Secretary of War (yes, it used to be called that) Henry Stimson believed that Stalin was not only keeping to the commitments made at Yalta, but he was also exceeding them. That aside, Poland was not America’s wartime ally, it was Britain’s, and therefore the “sell-out”, if indeed there was one, was Churchill’s. But the British Premier, who only a year later would deliver his Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, ultimately didn’t seem much bothered, and told Stalin and Roosevelt at Yalta that in his view, “The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefore they sang.” This is perhaps less surprising than it appears when one considers that in 1938 Churchill condemned Poland for having a “hyena’s appetite” for its role in helping to dismember Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the Munich Conference. (Much of this inconvenient history is left out of the history as told by our neocons and their friends at the New York Times). The myth of Roosevelt’s “sell-out” at Yalta owed as much to Poland’s large US domestic constituency (Polish emigres comprised a voting bloc of 6 million in 1945) than it owed to any strategic or moral failure on Roosevelt’s part.

All of which is not to say that Poland’s post-war fate within the Communist bloc was right, or just, or fair, or deserved. The Polish Home Army made heroic sacrifices in the fight against Hitler, particularly during the doomed Warsaw Uprising, during which Soviet tanks idled on the eastern bank of the Vistula while Warsaw burned. But if Stalin felt that inter-war Poland was not without sin, Roosevelt recognized that the Eastern and Central European states who allied themselves with Hitler (and were then in the process of being swallowed up by the advancing Red Army) were not exactly deserving of too much sympathy. As Roosevelt himself put it, “You can’t invoke high moral principles where high moral principles don’t exist.”

In war, justice counts for nothing: The facts on the ground are what matter. As Bohlen later noted, “The Red Army gave Stalin the power he needed to carry out his wishes, regardless of the promises at Yalta. Stalin held all the cards and played them well. Eventually we had to throw in our hand.” This realistic, even tragic, view of what transpired at Yalta has, over the course of the subsequent forty-year Cold War and in the years that have followed, been cast aside in favor of a narrative, now widely accepted among the foreign policy elite of both parties, that paints Roosevelt as a betrayer of Eastern Europe and a dupe of both Stalin and the communist sympathizers such as Alger Hiss who lurked within his own government. Like the myth of Munich, the myth of Yalta served – and continues to serve – the ideological purposes of the American establishment in their unyielding quest to confront, isolate, and contain Russia.

 

* This includes money that has been spent and committed to Zelensky’s Ukraine.

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