A strange mismatch between the reality of today’s world, and the way that the political class and the media understand it
Cross-posted from Aurelien’s substack “Trying to understand the world”

Not for the first time in modern history, there’s a strange mismatch between the reality of today’s world, and the way that the political class and the media understand it. I’ve written a number of times about this new reality: increasingly incapable political and government systems, a political class which needs instructions from YouTube to brush its teeth properly, militaries that are shadows of shadows of what they once were, education systems falling apart, economies on the point of collapse. Yet throughout all of this, there are still politicians talking bravely about going to war with forces they don’t have, and threatening “tough new laws” when they can’t enforce the existing ones.
We can easily dismiss all this as political froth: after all, it’s precisely weak governments that make the most bellicose threats and that seek to intimidate their populations. And indeed the behaviour of western governments over the last few years has been the typical behaviour of weak, frightened, administrations, lashing out against easy targets, and promising easy things, like lots of ones and zeroes for Ukraine. But there’s a bit more to it than that, because, whilst western governments are frightened, they still don’t realise how weak and vulnerable they actually are. In this week’s essay I’m going to try to explain something about the difference between strong and weak states, and suggest that some western states, at least, are weaker and much closer to collapse than we realise.
Ultimately, politics is about the control of terrain, and the ability to dictate what the rules of the political system within the area you control will be. Maybe that sounds a bit cold and clinical, but it’s the reality. You may remember Max Weber’s definition of a State, as that entity which “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” A number of things flow from this, including a wider legitimacy, which, most prosaically, means both acceptance that the State has this monopoly, and a disinclination to challenge it. In such a situation, it’s not necessary to actively like or admire the State, simply to accept it, and recognise that it fulfils this minimum criterion.
But legitimacy actually goes beyond that, to the services that the state provides, because a state that provides nothing has no useful legitimacy, even if it is able to stay in power by brute force. Now if you turn to the literature on this subject, you’ll find it suggested that the State, for example, should “guarantee human rights,” or safeguard the “dignity and well-being of their people” or some such formula. States should indeed do this, but it’s not their first or their most important task. That task is the provision of security in daily life, which is a subset of the control of terrain, and a state that cannot do that is a state that loses legitimacy quite quickly. This loss is not in the abstract either: it tends to be a loss to groups that will guarantee this safety, or at least offer to. Once this essential legitimacy is lost, the most a State can hope for is a sullen acquiescence in its continued political dominance, because there is no organised group more powerful (or less weak) than the State is.
Comfortable western societies tend to take this for granted. We assume that we are living on terrain that the elected government controls, and that therefore the laws that the government has introduced will be enforced as they were intended. Indeed, we complain when they are not, or alternatively when they are applied indiscriminately or with excessive force. Likewise, we assume that the state authorities will act correctly within their powers, and we complain if we feel this is not so. If we come home from an anti-Police march to find that our house has been burgled, we expect to report the crime, have the Police arrive and behave properly, and to try to locate the criminals. We complain if this is not the case.
But of course in most of the world it’s not the case, and it’s healthy to be reminded of just how untypical are our systems of justice are, in that they work reasonably well. Outside the Global North, many police and justice systems simply don’t work at all. Police forces in many African countries have no vehicles, and so cannot pursue criminals or investigate crimes at any distance from their Station. I remember a young and highly capable Police Colonel in Kinshasa telling me, with regret, that if I were the victim of a crime while I was there, I was welcome to come to see him to report it, but he would have to ask me for the money to buy paper and pencil to make a note of it. As for actually investigating, although he had a good theoretical knowledge of modern investigatory techniques, and had been trained in western academies, he had absolutely no investigatory resources at all. This situation is a great deal more common than you may think. (Inevitably, you can get donor money for human rights training in such countries, but not to buy vehicles, let alone pay the police properly.)
Even if most western countries are in somewhat better condition, this actually has little to do with higher levels of wealth and technology as such. As researchers for the UK Parliament noted, crime in Britain increased astronomically in the twentieth century, before declining steadily again over the last twenty years. That is, as the country became wealthier and more technologically advanced, crimes increased sharply, in spite of the far more sophisticated technology available to the Police. The likely conclusion, in fact, is that the Police, whatever their expertise, have rather less to do with changes in the rate of crime than we might think. Much of the recent decline—in Britain as elsewhere—is due to what is called Situational Crime Prevention, or crudely, making crime more difficult. Most crime is opportunist, and the widespread use of CCTV, better security for houses and cars and even better lighting can all act as deterrents. You can also design security in. During the recent violence in Europe, iPhones were stolen from a shop in the Netherlands. The phones automatically bricked themselves and sent out their position to the authorities.
The reasons why crime is lower in some countries and the State has control over the terrain, are thus only partly to do with resources and technology: they are also to do with the relationship between the State and the citizen. We can consider this relationship almost as a contractual one. The citizen pays taxes, obeys the law, respects State institutions and generally helps society function, and in return for this the State provides services, of which security is the most important, since it is the pre-condition for everything else. If you have never spent any time in a country where the State cannot provide security I wouldn’t wish the experience upon you, but obviously a consequence of that situation is that people withdraw their cooperation from the State, and start to lose all respect for it. And this doesn’t necessarily apply just to the countries you might immediately think of. When I was in South Africa in the dying days of apartheid, the security system there was taken to be powerful, ruthless, well-funded etc. The South African Police were a paramilitary organisation, who looked very mean and were heavily armed. Yet when I was in a hotel in prosperous central Johannesburg for the first time, I was told, under no circumstances should I leave the hotel on foot after dark, because “you won’t get fifty metres without being robbed and maybe murdered.” Now some of this was probably White paranoia (I walked through a number of South African cities quite safely, essentially by just not looking like a tourist) but it was nonetheless based on genuine fears and plenty of actual experience. So: the paradox that a large and well-armed Police service couldn’t provide security around an upmarket hotel in the centre of the country’s most important city.
In fact, it’s not a paradox. During apartheid, the SAP were heavily involved with combating the “terrorist threat,” harassing dissidents and suppressing demonstrations, and when that all went away, it turned out that they hadn’t ever really got around to learning how to prevent and detect crime properly. So the wealthier white families had barbed wire and cameras around their houses, and subscribed to various armed response services. The rest of the population had to put up with a high level of criminality, which turned out to be a real problem after 1994, when ordinary people demanded that the State look after their security, and the Police services didn’t remotely have the resources to do so. What the Police had been for, in those days, after all, was to preserve the apartheid system: they were not taken very seriously as a crime-fighting force, and in any case were regarded as the enemy by most of the population.
Even in the preservation of that system, though, the apartheid regime benefited from the fact that the opposition was weak, and that individuals in and out of the country could be targeted for imprisonment and assassination quite easily. It was the cost and controversy of the war in Angola, together with the frightening level of urban violence in the country itself that made negotiations seem the easier route for the Afrikaners when the Cold War ended. And it turned out in the end that nobody was prepared to die for apartheid.
This was a case where a conventional attempt to overthrow the system was impossible, but the system itself was too exhausted to continue beyond a certain point. We often describe a regime which is good at locking up or killing its political enemies as “strong,” but this isn’t always the case. Indeed, there are actually three levels of political control, and western politicians and pundits have a habit of misunderstanding and confusing them. In increasing order of difficulty, the first is control over the political process and the ability to neutralise challengers to it. The second is control of the terrain of the country such that the state exercises the monopoly of legitimate violence and can ensure the law is obeyed, most of the time at least. The third is legitimacy, where the population itself accepts and even endorses the government system, and works with it. Let’s look at some examples, before turning to western states today.
Countries that behave aggressively to their political enemies are thus not necessarily strong. The West saw Gaddafi as a strong leader because he had an efficient secret police that eliminated challenges to the regime and large and powerful armed forces. For that reason, it put a lot of store in him as a secular opponent of Islamic extremism (which he was) from 2004 onwards. But what the West failed to understand was that his survival depended firstly on using money from natural resources to keep the population quiet, and secondly on a careful balancing act keeping the tribes from combining against him. It was a high wire which he eventually fell off, and the stupefaction in western chancelleries was a sight to behold. In the end, the regime turned out to be much weaker than anticipated, as did the regime of Syria’s Assad, once the Russians were occupied elsewhere, and a coalition less weak than the government forces was put together.
Likewise, governments may be stable for long periods of time simply because they never encounter a challenger less weak than they themselves are. That was notably true of Mali from 2013 to the present time: the most recent rebel advances towards Bamako were essentially because for once the JNIM and the Azawad rebels were fighting on the same side, if not necessarily together. Which is to say that you really can’t tell the “strength” of a political system until it is put under stress. In the end, few people cared enough about the legitimacy of the government in Bamako to die for it.
Western governments, meanwhile, have spent the last forty years undermining their own legitimacy without realising it, or even greatly caring. The side of the citizenship bargain that involves the government providing benefits and security of various sorts has somehow been forgotten. Government has itself been re-conceptualised into a kind of hotel management system, where “services” are provided as though they were housekeeping and laundry, and where the guests are always free to move to another hotel if they don’t like it. Nobody, as I’ve pointed out many times, is going to die for this. Indeed, not only is the idea of military national service in such a situation farcical, it’s not even obvious why the general population should give their support to a state of that kind in any practical way. Why pay your taxes honestly when there is no chance of being found out? Why observe speed limits when you can’t be detected? Why even knock on a neighbour’s door and tell them they’ve left their car unlocked?
And why obey a state which cannot protect you? The world is divided into countries where, if you call, the Police will come, and others where there’s just no point. In the West, and especially in Europe, we have become used to the emergency services—not just the Police—appearing if we need them. Nonetheless, there has always been a Liberal confusion about the State: on the one hand, something whose powers are to be feared and circumscribed, on the other a provider of services, just like pizza delivery, and the enforcers of contract law and the protection of private property. And it follows that agents of the State—especially the Police—are just a higher form of pizza delivery man on a bike, there to provide services when needed, and otherwise to be ignored and even mocked. Often these two concepts co-exist, even in the same person. Recently in France, literally the same people who have been chanting “All Cops Are Bastards” (in English) on marches, are in the media demanding that the Police put more effort into fighting violence against women and children. Business models have to be preserved, after all. As always, it’s too facile to regard this just as hypocrisy, though that’s part of it. It’s principally the expression of the complete dissociation from reality of the Professional and Managerial Caste (PMC) and its purely normative view of the world. So journalists were stunned to discover that, in order to deal with the unrest in various French cities, resource-intensive investigations into child-abuse rings had to be put on hold. But surely you can always find more Police, can’t you? Just advertise. Anyway, can’t AI do some of the work? Can’t you contract it to the private sector? (And we’ve seen just recently what happens when personnel with no training in crowd control are rushed onto the street because they are all you have.)
What the last few months have shown is that in Europe, as in every other part of the world, the ability of the State to keep order and protect its citizens is not guaranteed, and in some cases is very limited. It largely comes down to a question of numbers. Modern western states depend for their functioning on most people obeying the law most of the time, and almost everybody obeying important laws nearly all the time. This is why, in most countries, fewer than 5% of the population commit 95% of all crimes, and within that 5% or less, a small percentage commit very serious crimes, and an even smaller proportion, in a Pareto-style regression, commit serious crimes frequently. To a very large extent, our civilisation and our safety depend on those figures at least remaining roughly constant, if not reducing. Yet in most western countries, it’s historically not been fear of the State that prevents people from committing crimes (though ease of being found out plays a part) but a complicated mixture of habit, social pressure and an inbuilt sense of morality. All of these are in the process of disappearing slowly, and in some cases, they have largely gone.
Criminality also tends to be very concentrated geographically, and one of the problems is that politicians and pundits themselves generally live in low-crime areas. On the other hand, there are parts of European cities, largely but by no means exclusively immigrant-populated, where the Police simply do not go, and from which the State has effectively withdrawn. In many countries this is a conscious political decision. In France, for a generation, successive governments have not wanted to run the political risk of trying to enforce the law in a volatile atmosphere where arms are in free circulation, and such structure, and such employment as there is, are largely provided by gangs. Whilst the Police have been successful in breaking up some gangs that are trafficking drugs and exploiting women and children, everyday law-enforcement is effectively impossible these days without the continuous risk of attacks and even riots. If a non-white person were injured, let alone killed as a result, the media and the political class would go nuts. However, the problem goes beyond that: schools are in decline because they can’t attract teachers, who fear being threatened and attacked, social services and medical services are hard to find, and their personnel vulnerable to violence as well. For a generation, successive political leaderships have shrugged their shoulders and let the problem stew. Many of those people aren’t White anyway. Some are illegal immigrants. But in the last few years we have seen sorties by groups from these areas into the town centres, smashing and looting, and the Police simply cannot cope. Groups from these areas infiltrated the Gilets jaunes marches in 2018-19, and have taken advantage of recent demonstrations as well.
Here, we come to a fundamental point about public security: it’s a question of numbers again. Even in a small or medium-sized city, the number of potential targets for violent criminals is so large as to be effectively unmanageable. A few hundred determined criminals, ready to smash their way into shops and institutions, and operating in small groups, are effectively impossible to stop. The ubiquitous masks and dark clothing make CCTV identification largely impossible, and by the time the Police are on their way, the criminals will be long gone. The mere presence of the Police can be a deterrent to some, or a reassurance to others, but various studies have shown that the possibility of a Police patrol just happening to arrive as a violent robbery takes place is typically too low to be worth measuring. And there are well-established criminal networks, involved. Many of the goods stolen on 13 October were on sale on social media sites the day after.
The situation is complicated by legal constraints on the use of force. Under French law, for example, a shopkeeper, like any property owner, is not allowed to use force to defend their property, but only to call the Police. And for the Police, their reaction must be “proportional”, but also only that which “absolute necessity” demands. In practice, it’s doubtful whether there is any feasible level of force that could be practically employed to stop groups of looters, without massive political, and perhaps legal, repercussions. This is why there are so many videos circulating of the Police effectively standing by and watching shops being pillaged.
All of this, of course, does the credibility and the legitimacy of the State no good whatever. The least we expect of a state is that it can enforce its laws, especially when we ourselves suffer if this isn’t done. Victims of crime in areas where the Police do not go have hardly any recourse except to the gangs themselves, and it’s hardly surprising that the traditional Right is beginning to make headway among such communities. Nor do shopkeepers and small businesses feel very happy, because they see the State, to which they pay their taxes and owe their loyalty, simply unable to protect them. And we’re not talking about historically high-crime areas: the looting on 13 October was in a yuppifying area of Eastern Paris. So in many cities shops, restaurants and bars are now routinely closing on Saturdays: many will have to close down by the end of the year if the violence continues. But even if the will and the law permitted, the authorities simply cannot protect everyone and everything. We are back to numbers once more.
The same is true of violence which has a more explicitly political agenda (though it’s true to say that sometimes the different types are hard to distinguish.) In modern times, western states have not been confronted with organised violence on a large scale. Neither the IRA in Ireland nor ETA in Spain numbered more than a few hundred activists at any given time. Their targets tended to be symbols of state power (though the IRA did practice mass-casualty attacks) and they never expected to overthrow the state by such operations, which were seen as part of a much longer campaign. “Non-violent” activists, whose activities were limited to things like breaking and entering and damaging things, were simply interested in the resulting publicity. By contrast, actual armed attempts to seize power in the West are extremely rare in modern times, and the circumstances (France in 1961, Spain in 1981, Rumania in 1989) have always been quite special. There are no groups in western states today capable of such activities.
So that means that western states, however unpopular their governments, are nevertheless safe then? Well, you might be forgiven for thinking so. There’s a lot of bellicose talk, and money made at least hypothetically available for weapons, threats of new laws and censorship, among other things. Yet as I’ve indicated, much of this is bluster, and here, it’s useful to think back to the examples of Libya and South Africa mentioned earlier. Modern states can defeat the kind of small-scale challenges to their authority that could be mounted now, and they can arrest or harass individual journalists or political actors, but that’s about it.
By contrast, no western state remotely has the capability for a war with Russia (or for that matter China) and for practical reasons this will not change. It’s often assumed, especially in the alt-media, that western powers are preparing for “war” with Russia, or even trying to provoke it. This is quite wrong: western countries are incapable of any significant escalation other than verbal, and sending the odd drone. An actual war with Russia, even involving all NATO nations, would be over in an afternoon, but this is something that’s hard to get into the heads of western leaders, who think they can keep up these performative gestures, and keep facilitating pinprick attacks, and nothing bad will ever happen. After all, they just keep telling themselves and others, the West is richer than Russia, and its total armed forces are of comparable size. But then we have a generation of political leaders almost totally ignorant of the reality of military affairs.
All this comes directly from fear: not of invasion by Russia, but of the end of the fighting in Ukraine and of a consequent political defeat which few western leaders can hope to survive, mixed with potentially terrifying economic consequences. As long as the war goes on, as long as the ball is kept in the air, this situation can be postponed. So long as ones and zeroes can be magicked up, so long as Ukrainians can be found to die, the war will go on, and the worst will not happen. And the more thoughtful leaders are beginning to realise, with a cold feeling in their stomachs, that a strong, angry Russia will come looking for revenge after the fighting eventually stops. Obviously, then, that fighting has to continue as long as possible. And for what it’s worth, a continuing war is not going to be an excuse for large-scale political repression either: modern states simply do not have the kind of coercive capabilities they had during the Cold War. Declaring a state of emergency is easy: enforcing it is something else. And you can’t give the authorities the right to use greater force without legislation.
The threat to western states today is thus not really from a war they might provoke, nor from organised political violence against them. It is actually far worse than that, and is a consequences of two elite-inflicted wounds on western society. One, obviously, is globalisation and neoliberalism, which has created societies, economies and institutions which are highly complex, obscure in their workings, and completely lacking in redundancy. The result is the worst of all worlds. If you design a complex system from scratch, and you can’t always tell in advance what the interaction will be between different elements of it, you should design redundancy into it from the beginning. Passenger aircraft are designed like that for example. But here, we have a system which is not only complex but complicated, where there is no central intent, where the parts change all the time and there is no redundancy designed in, because there is no designer. Imagine an aircraft manufacturer no two of whose planes were identical, because various components had been sourced from different suppliers in an unpredictable fashion depending on who was cheapest. It’s not just that the system probably has no redundancy, it’s also that it may not actually be able to perform at all if subject to certain types of stress. But we won’t know that until it happens.
So long as targets were limited to traditional state-related institutions, this was less serious (though see below.) But whether we are talking about gangs smashing their way into schools and assaulting teachers or burning down town halls and post offices on the one hand, or hackers bringing complete IT systems to a halt on the other, we have gone past political activity, or even crime in the simple sense, to the kind of nihilistic violence I wrote about a couple of weeks ago. If the only purpose is to destroy, then the range of targets is nearly infinite, and the main criterion for choosing the target will be ease of access. If your bank goes offline for days, if the local supermarkets have to be closed because of software problems, if your local coffee bar is burned down, if the traffic lights near you have all been smashed, then you are going to feel the effects directly, and you will understandably join the chorus of those asking what the hell the government is doing about it. The answer, of course, is that there is not much the government can do, not least because little of the national infrastructure is under its control these days, and much of what used to be enforcement is now in private hands. Whilst governments can and will blame outside actors (and who knows, they may be right in some cases) this doesn’t actually help, and the result will be a further erosion in legitimacy.
The second, directly linked, is the destruction of the capability of the state, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Much of the expertise, and a large proportion of the skilled personnel that governments had even thirty years ago has gone. The State no longer has even the sheer numbers any more. Military forces have been cut to the bone, Police and emergency services have been reduced and, most of all, few countries now even have the central machinery for evaluating crises and responding to them. (Although the Police are not allowed to strike, large numbers of them had “medical appointments” during Tuesday’s public sector stoppages in France.) Moreover, so wide is the range of potential targets, and so limited is the capability of the government to protect them, that it will be reduced to making speeches and snarling at its critics. That’s not great for legitimacy either.
We are back to my favourite metaphor of politics as engineering. You can bring down a large system by confronting it with superior force, or alternatively by exploiting a point of weakness. If your objective is just to bring down the system (or anyway damage it severely) then the second is easier and quicker. We are still under the romantic spell of popular revolutions and the people/united/will never be defeated. But in fact things very rarely happen like that. I have several times cited Curzio Malaparte and his book Technique du coup d’état, where he warned, nearly a century ago, that modern western states are extremely fragile, and can be overturned by a small group of determined and well-organised people. But we are a stage further here: the aim is not even to overthrow the state and capture it, but just to damage it, and perhaps bring it down, either out of nihilistic anger or in the vague hope that it might be replaced by something better.
In recent western history, the norm has been mass demonstrations, which occasionally turned violent. Now I hear from those who have attended many demonstrations that they have their uses in recruiting followers, getting publicity, increasing solidarity, and so on, and I’m prepared to believe that. In France anyway, they are ritualised and generally good-natured, and bars and restaurants do a roaring trade from them. What they don’t do, I’m afraid, is change government policy: to do that you need to apply overwhelming force to a sensitive point, and this street theatre is not the way to do it. So in 2003 huge numbers of people demonstrated against the up-coming war in Iraq: a million was claimed for the demonstration in London. But the actual effect on governments was a mild irritant: much bigger issues were at stake. This will always be the case, unless you have absolutely overwhelming force, as did the demonstrators in Tehran in 1978. The Shah was gravely ill anyway by that point.
But as we’ve already seen, you can damage the State in other ways. Although most of the Lycées in France are open normally, some two hundred are blockaded every day, often involving violence against teachers and damage to the buildings, and throwing of improvised bombs made from fireworks. So the Lycées have to be closed, and tens of thousands of children don’t get an education. Parents and teachers are naturally furious, especially since the disruption comes from a tiny number of students, but in fact there’s nothing that can be done. The use of force to unblock the Lycées would be illegal and, if the pupils don’t want to give up, nobody can force them. The blockades will probably go on to the end of the year. This is a good example of how quite a small number of determined people can shut down entire institutions.
They can also do worse. Since 2015, troops have been deployed on the streets of France under Operation Sentinelle. You see them patrolling around the major cities in four-person groups. This is a big commitment, and something like 10,000 personnel are involved, about two thirds in Paris. Yet as a senior General responsible for these things remarked to me some years ago, it’s almost entirely theatre. In practice, it has been impossible to predict terrorist attacks anyway: the first in 2015 was directed against a Jewish school, but was stopped by pure chance, the main massacres later that year were carried out in a concert hall and on the terraces of cafés, and the grand finale was supposed to be a suicide vest attack on an international football match, which only the incompetence of the attackers prevented from causing hundreds of deaths. The most the military can do is provide some reassurance, and potentially react quickly if they happen to be nearby. And the numbers aren’t impressive: perhaps 6500 personnel in Paris sounds a lot, but not all of those patrol, and those that do , work in shifts. At any one point there might be around fifty four-man detachments to cover the most “obvious” tourist areas, railway stations, airports etc.
Historically, the Islamic State and its confrères have avoided attacking western states directly, going instead for what they see as their immoral and decadent western populations. But others may feel differently, and in many ways this is more worrying. Important pubic buildings tend to be protected by armed police or military, although their weapons are not always loaded, and in any case their legal ability to use them is very limited. But whilst they might be a disincentive to armed attack, they are no protection at all against, say, a hundred assailants armed with iron bars. In practice, a handful even of armed guards would make no difference, and legally they would not be able to use their weapons anyway. Perhaps such a determined group could storm the Elysée Palace, as almost happened in 2018 during a Gilets jaunes demonstration. Then where would we be? And the number of other potential targets is enormous.
We are not in this fragile situation by accident. The despair and nihilism that have powered so much of the recent violence is the product of a neoliberal regime that just doesn’t care. The abandonment of districts and communities to organised crime and the withdrawal of the State was a conscious decision. It was always safely over there, but now, quite unexpectedly of course, it’s starting to come over here and the ruling classes have begun to panic, starting to realise the glass houses in which they live and work. Lashing out indiscriminately at critics isn’t going to help either. I wonder what Mr Macron will think, looking down from the helicopter which has evacuated him from the burning remains of the Elysée Palace. Oh shit, now how on earth did that happen?
You and I, of course, will not have a helicopter.
KEEP RESISTANCE MEDIA ALIVE IN 2027


Be the first to comment