Ian Proud was a member of His Britannic Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He served as the Economic Counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019. He recently published his memoir, “A Misfit in Moscow: How British diplomacy in Russia failed, 2014-2019,” and is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute.
Cross-posted from Responsible Statecraft
In a major policy shift, the British government decided this week to lift sanctions on Russian energy products, in two ways.
First, a general trade license was issued allowing for the import of diesel and jet fuel from Russian oil that has been processed in third countries like India and Turkey. A second license provides for the importation of Russian liquefied natural gas from two terminals, Sakhalin 2, which supplies gas to Asia, and Yamal, which supplies gas to Europe.
U.K. mainstream media and opposition political parties have reacted furiously to this sanctions relief move as a concession to “dirty Russian oil“. A Ukrainian member of parliament pointed out that Keir Starmer made a commitment to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky not to remove sanctions against Russia. The Daily Telegraph labelled the Prime Minister “comrade Keir” on the basis that he was making concessions to the “Soviets,” more than three decades after the Soviet Union collapsed. Such is the febrile nature of political discussion of Russia in the United Kingdom.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer justified his move as a response to rising energy prices and reiterated his longer-term plan to tighten sanctions against Russia. On May 19, the same day the United Kingdom’s measure came into force, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent issued a 30-day extension to a license lifting any restriction on the export of Russian oil. It is hard to imagine that the timing of both the U.K. and U.S. measures was a coincidence.
Indeed, it is a sign that the U.K. is coming further into line with the U.S. on lifting energy restrictions to ease global supply concerns. In March, the U.S. Treasury also issued a general license which remains in force, to provide for the temporary lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil.
Under fire from the U.K. press, the government has insisted that this is a short-term measure. But there is reason to believe it could endure for a while.
The jet fuel and diesel license clearly states that it is of indefinite duration and that the license will be reviewed periodically. The idea of a periodic review might pacify potential critics although the statement is meaningless: with over three thousand U.K. sanctions against Russia there is no system in place for this and I know of no examples of the U.K. reviewing then repealing a Russia sanction unless subject to legal challenge. So, the move on diesel and jet fuel appears to represent a permanent lifting of sanctions on key products for the U.K. economy. There is an obvious reason for this.
The U.K. imports almost 70% of its jet fuel and 40% of its diesel. Lifting restrictions on plentiful Russian oil that is processed into diesel and jet fuel is an economically rational policy choice and therefore a sensible thing to do.
We have already seen flights being cancelled in the U.K. as fears about a jet fuel crisis mount. Russia is benefiting from an energy revenue windfall from the stand-off over Iran irrespective of any restrictive measures imposed by the West. Maintaining sanctions on Russian energy merely has a boomerang effect on the countries imposing those sanctions, including Britain itself.
There is no sign yet that the EU plans to follow the U.S. and the U.K. in lifting restrictions on diesel and jet fuel There certainly appears to be less concern in Europe about a possible crisis in air travel.
While the U.K. measure to ease restrictions on diesel and jet fuel shows a commendable realism, its motive for softening sanctions on LNG are less directly related to core U.K. interests. Britain hasn’t imported any Russian LNG since the start of the war in Ukraine and even before the war started, imported negligible volumes of Russian gas.
Rather, and at least in part, the LNG exemption is intended to remain in line with the European Union at a time when Keir Starmer has been pushing the idea of the U.K. deepening economic ties with Europe. Three-quarters of the LNG from the Yamal field — one of the two covered by the U.K. license — goes to European customers, accounting for 7.2 billion Euros in 2025 alone.
While the EU has recently banned short-term purchases on the spot market, which had been subject to heavy profiteering, long-term contracts remain unsanctioned through to January 1, 2027. This is precisely when the U.K. license also expires, bringing the U.K. and the EU fully in lockstep. The license also indicates that the Minister may “‘vary, revoke or suspend”’ the license at any time, allowing flexibility should the EU policy change.
Britain’s temporary decision to lift the ban on LNG exports from Sakhalin 2 is more tangential to U.K. interests. That terminal is located in Asia, with most of its LNG going to Japan, China and South Korea, which are suffering a major energy shock from the war against Iran. Amid high global energy prices, the U.K. move appears to be driven by a mix of rational considerations and support for allied nations in both Europe and in Asia.
In a further attempt to spin the sanctions relief package, the U.K. government updated its Russia sanctions’ regulations claiming that this was a move to act tougher on Russia, while opening the door to diesel and jet fuel. The updated regulations tightened restrictions on everything from uranium imports to ship servicing contracts (including ships that transport LNG).
However, the updated sanctions regulation is at most a technical sharpening of rules that already have — as I have often pointed out — no obvious effect on Russia’s economy.
The inescapable reality is that this easing of sanctions is perhaps the first example of the U.K. putting its strategic interests – specifically the need to manage energy availability and price for British industry and consumers – above the bloviation that characterizes discourse on Russia policy.
The reaction has been so harsh that I do not expect further British innovations in foreign policy, such as a determined push to secure a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine, which would put a stop to the killing (and the West’s self-harming sanctions). For that, you see, would amount to another sell-out and unacceptable concession to Vladimir Putin.
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