Amidst the US-Iran negotitions, Alastair Crooke says, Iran is not incentivized to end the war. Instead, it seeks to upend America’s hegemonic dominance of the region — and “break the paradigm.”
The whole world is watching as negotiations begin today in Islamabad, Pakistan between Iran and the United States following an agreement to cease military action for two weeks. The negotiations are based on a ten-point plan outlined by Iran and approved by the United States as a basis for the talks.
Israel has not been invited to the negotiations, which are being conducted indirectly and with a great deal of skepticism by the Iranian team. The outcome of these talks will impact the entire global economy and the fate of millions of people in West Asia, six million of whom have already been forcibly displaced by US and Israeli aggression in recent years.
Chris Hedges discusses the peace talks with former British Diplomat Alastair Crooke, who has participated in past negotiations between Palestinian groups and Israel and who studied the rise of Islamic groups in the region. Crooke explains that the current Islamabad talks are rife with contradictions and are impeded by a failure of the West to understand that the goal of Iran, in the defense of its sovereignty, is “to blow up the existing paradigm” that has plagued Iran for nearly 50 years, which Crooke describes as a “revolutionary objective” that has both financial and cultural elements.
Many factors have led to Iran maintaining a position of strength throughout the recent US-Israeli aggression, which gives it an advantage in these talks. Meanwhile, Israel is in a position of weakness as it fights on multiple fronts with a military in a state of collapse and a population in distress. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a court case, which could result in his imprisonment, and an upcoming election.
And for the United States, Crooke explains that its miscalculated war on Iran has backfired, leading to the rise of the Chinese Yuan, the decline of the petrodollar, significant losses of its infrastructure in the Middle East and a conflict that, like the Vietnam War, is being fought on difficult terrain for which the US is not prepared. Hedges compares this situation to the Suez Crisis in 1956 that accelerated the decline of the British Empire. When asked if the US is likely to restart the war on Iran, Crooke responds with “What’s really left to the United States militarily to do that would be a game changer?”
Transcript
Chris Hedges: The Trump administration and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire and two weeks of negotiations, which began today in Islamabad following six weeks of warfare. The basis of the negotiations will be a 10-point proposal put forward by Iran, not Trump’s vaunted 15-point plan, that include a call for cessation of all hostilities in the region, including in Lebanon where Israel has been carrying out punishing airstrikes, reparations paid to Iran, the release of billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, a withdrawal of U.S. military bases in the region, the lifting of all sanctions on Iran, and a permanent and formalized end to hostilities. The agreement calls for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s daily oil and gas shipments are transited.
Iran, however, has so far refused to open the Strait, insisting that Israel’s attacks on Lebanon must first end and the billions in frozen assets must be repatriated to Iran. While Iran has clearly suffered devastating blows to its infrastructure, manufacturing, and military assets, including naval and air assets, while it has seen senior leaders, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assassinated, none of the objectives set out by Israel in the US have been met. The Iranian regime remains in power. It controls the Strait. It retains significant missile and drone stockpiles, and it still possesses enriched uranium.
Iran is the clear winner of Operation Epic Fury. The US is indisputably in a weaker position than when the war began. Trump has, at the same time, caused incalculable damage to America’s moral reputation by taking part in an unprovoked attack on Iran and openly advocating war crimes, including a call to obliterate Iranian civilization and take out civilian infrastructure, including power plants. He squandered an estimated $39 billion on the war, costs that will be felt at home, especially with rising prices. The global economy remains in crisis, and even if hostilities do not resume, it will take months to recover.
Iran, most importantly, is now the indisputable master of the Strait, charging tankers $2 million to transit through the Strait. It has a stranglehold on the global economy. The new Iranian leadership, centered around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is more defiant and intransigent than the old leadership killed by Israel and the U.S. in targeted assassinations. This is bad news for the U.S. and especially Israel.
US and Israeli strikes killed more than 1,700 Iranian civilians, including 254 children. Three million Iranians have been displaced from their homes, along with one million Lebanese. Add to these numbers the two million Palestinians displaced by the genocide in Gaza. Six million people rendered homeless.
Joining me to discuss the war on Iran is Alistair Crooke, a former British diplomat, who served for many years in the Middle East working as a security advisor to the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, as well as helping lead efforts to set up negotiations and truces between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian resistance groups. He was instrumental in establishing the 2002 ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. He is also the author of “Resistance, the Essence of the Islamist Revolution”, which analyzes the ascendancy of Islamic movements in the Middle East.
I’ll just begin, Alistair, with a very broad question. Where are we at this moment?
Alastair Crooke: It’s a very broad question. It’s a very good question because this is not really clear at the moment. First of all, although we call it a ceasefire, it is not really a ceasefire, in the sense that a ceasefire normally has some prior understandings that underpin a ceasefire. We do have a halt of, if you like, military activities across, or supposed to be across, all fronts. Although in the introduction you pointed out that Israel was attacking Lebanon causing many deaths and casualties in the process in a deliberate act to exclude Lebanon from the whole process.
What’s happening at the moment is that there are two delegations in Islamabad. They are not meeting directly; they are meeting indirectly. They are quite big delegations because there are delegations of experts that are involved in this process. It is hinged on the 10-point plan or framework that Iran insisted there should be. The precondition for the meeting to take place was that the United States should agree that this was an acceptable basis for discussion. The Americans agreed to that.
Now, where we are at the moment is, as I understand it from Islamabad, is that nothing really very much is happening. There are the general discussions, but the Iranians believe that the United States have not fulfilled some of the undertakings they gave to Pakistan. Particularly, there seems to be hitches on the release of the frozen assets. And there are other elements that are taking place that are not very clear at the moment. I think it would be better to describe this, particularly from an Iranian point of view, this was an effort, if you like, to have at least a halt in the military side of the war to explore whether there was any room for maneuver, politically.
I mean we call that in the Middle East a Hudna rather than a ceasefire. It’s a temporary truce, if you like, really to explore if there is political will to move forward. And as I understand it, at this moment, that is not clear. So, it’s not clear whether the negotiations will continue past today or whether they will end today.
I don’t think that there is any great expectation of an agreement, certainly from the Iranian side. And I think that we may find that we finish the day with nothing really solid emerging from this. And the continual prospect that there will be military action initiated by Israel either again in Lebanon, where Israel is insistent that it should not be included in this process and that this is quite separate and that they’re in discussion with the Lebanese government in order to have the demilitarization, the disarmament, of Hezbollah, and that’s a separate issue and can’t be included.
The Iranian position is very simple. It’s going to be either a ceasefire for all or a ceasefire for nobody. If the Israelis insist that Lebanon is outside of these agreements and outside of these discussions, then in that case Israel can be outside of these discussions and Iran will continue the war on Israel.
So, I think it’s unclear how far we are going to get, but the expectations, as I hear or judge from there, are not very optimistic that something will emerge. And it’s not surprising. I mean, I don’t think it’s surprising. I’m sure it isn’t surprising to you because there are enormous contradictions in this whole process. They are the differences in the interests of the United States and of Iran and what Iran’s objectives are, which are very poorly understood, I believe, in the United States and poorly understood more generally in the West, how serious they are, the objectives for this war.
I mean, in a nutshell, the objectives of Iran are to blow up the existing paradigm. That is a revolutionary objective, to blow it up completely in order that they can escape, if you like, from the cage in which they’ve been held for 48 years, surrounded by US military forces, besieged by tariffs, by restrictions, UN resolutions, political isolation, economic, cultural, if you like, boycott. So, this is what they are trying to break out from. It’s not the same cage that the Hamas and the Palestinians are in in Gaza, which has got a literal fence and drones and monitoring of it, but Iran is intent on breaking the paradigm. And the key to breaking that paradigm, of course, is the Hormuz and their control of the Hormuz, which is the centerpiece of their strategic objectives.
Chris Hedges: Do they have the capacity, in your view, to break that paradigm?
Alastair Crooke: Yes, I think they have moved in that direction. I noticed what you said in the introduction about the devastation that had been visited on Iran, and I know this will seem counterintuitive to many of your listeners, but in fact Iran has emerged from this one month of war or so in a much stronger position than it did from the ‘12-Day War’ in June. It is in a much stronger position.
There is a lot of propaganda on all sides in this war, but there are some things that one can say very clearly that Iran has effected enormous damage on American bases in the Gulf area. It has destroyed all the radar abilities. I think altogether something like seven radars have been destroyed in the first phase of the war. They have not only destroyed that, they have complete control over the Hormuz and they have still, at this time – of course, Iran doesn’t have an air force and therefore cannot have air dominance, but instead of which they have created missile dominance over the airspace of the whole region, including Israel. The damage to their missile capabilities has been grossly overstated by the old tactic of just counting, this goes back to Vietnam, counting air strikes. And one of the things that has been most notable in this period is before the war, Iran bought from China a huge number of decoys -decoy planes, decoy missiles – and one of the things, not only are they very effective in their appearance, but I didn’t know until recently, is they have a heat source in them. So, they are hot. And so of course that shows up on the American sensors and the Israeli sensors as a real target, a real plane, a real missile when it’s really only a decoy.
The missile systems are buried deep in mountains. A main missile is 800 meters under a granite mountain. It has a whole railway system in the mountain and that carries the missiles from the cities, from the magazine, along a railway track to an entrance. A door opens, the missile is fired from the railway line, and then the door shuts.
And, although it’s been bombed innumerable times, part of that 16,000 strikes we have made on Iran, it still functions. Half an hour after the airstrike, the missile comes out and continues. The mountain is getting slightly damaged and black, but nothing is affecting the missile cities.
Their command system is functioning, thanks to the mosaic decentralization of command, disbursement of command. It’s created almost a sort of mechanical structure that snaps into action as soon as Iran is attacked or as soon as there is an attempt at a decapitation strike. I mean they started instituting this after what they saw in 2003 with the American attack on Baghdad that they had to find a way of countering this and countering the air attacks that took place in Baghdad.
So, I mean, it’s impossible to give precise figures, but I believe that the amount of deaths in Tehran are probably less than in the ‘12-Day War’. They did this simply by – they learned from the ‘12-Day War’ -empty every public building completely. So, universities, everything, are completely empty. All the government offices are empty. And so, Israel has been destroying those, counting those up as a huge damage caused to Iran.
And the most significant thing, I would say, is the financial aspect of it. In the first month of this war, Iran has earned double from its oil sales and tankers, double what it has earned in any month for several years past. It’s earned double. If you take just one case about a week ago last Sunday, there were five tankers loading in Kharg with 7.7 million barrels of oil. That, on one day, earned Iran 850 million dollars in the sales. Then, of course, they are earning from 2 million from every tanker and vessel that passes through Hormuz as part of the toll that they are insisting that ships have to pay.
So, the economic situation is, one can calculate from these figures, not just me but others have done that, that on this basis, Iran could earn a little short of a trillion dollars a year through the control of the Hormuz. But it doesn’t stop there. And I will explain why, because it’s also about supply lines. It controls supply lines – helium, sulfuric acid, all of these essential elements to our supply lines for manufacturing technical items and also for manufacturing chips and things. The chip factory in Taiwan is almost at a standstill now because they need helium and they need liquified gas in order to make chips. So, supply lines, food, fertilizer. This is it.
If you compare it to what happened with China when Trump imposed a huge tariff on China, 155%, I think, at one point it was. And the presidency said, “Well, okay, but I’m putting some restrictions actually on rare earths and other commodities. And so that’s going to be what you’re going to have to do without.” And of course it changed. And so, really that the Chinese tactic is also part of the Hormuz structure. It’s not just the sale of oil, not just the tolls, but it is about supply lines and it is also something much more complicated, which is the insistence that the cargos be paid in Yuan.
And this is a part of, if you like, the attempt to deculture the whole of the GCC area, which has always been the central hub of dollar hegemony. This is the center of the petrodollar and it was encouraged from ‘73 when it started to keep the oil price up because all of the proceeds go to Wall Street. Wall Street then leverages it in the financial world. And so, you have in the Gulf States a highly financialized type of economy with all of the data centers and others there. And Iran is telling the Gulf states, “If you want to enjoy a relationship with Iran, you have to get rid of Microsoft, Amazon. You have to get rid of these. What do you need? This huge 30 billion data center in the UAE. You have to get rid of this.” This is, if you like, part of, I wouldn’t call it a cultural revolution because it’s a financial cultural revolution that the Iranians are seeking to establish. That’s what I mean by breaking the paradigm. I’m sorry it’s a complicated explanation, but it’s bigger than just can ships go up or down. It’s a much bigger, more ambitious plan than is properly appreciated.
Chris Hedges: Some people have described this as the equivalent of our Suez Crisis. That was 1956 when the British and the French, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal. They tried to take it back. It was a fiasco. They had to retreat, well, along with the Israelis. Would you agree?
Alastair Crooke: Yes, I would say it’s the same because there’s really, if anyone knows the geography of Hormuz, I mean the literal what it looks like, the landscape of Hormuz, it’s very evident that there is no way that the Americans, as things stand, this has been planned for a long time by the Iranians. The whole of that Hormuz sea-line is bordered by caves. It’s cliffs, and in those cliffs are anti-ship missiles. Under Hormuz, they have submersible drones. We haven’t seen them used yet, but these submersible drones have tunnels under the Hormuz’s waterway so that the drones can come out under sea, not visible, can’t be seen by anyone. They have lithium batteries that can last for four days. They have the ability to loiter and they have AI capacity to then choose and select targets. Then they have surface drones, very highspeed drones with explosives.
And what is unnoticed, but is crucial to this, is they have these mini submarines, two-man submarines, small submarines, but they can operate in the shallow waters of the Hormuz Strait and the Hormuz Waterway. And they are equipped with anti-ship missiles and also with these drones too. It would be a suicide to try and put a landing craft down the Straits. The Straits themselves are under fire control because on the other side of Hormuz that is a sort of bend around the peninsula and then behind that are mountains and they are riddled with caves and emplacements of artillery. So, the whole of the Hormuz Straits, you don’t need to have drones or missiles, they control it by artillery fire. It’s within range. And that exists right up to Kharg Island. So, any ship trying to go up this waterway will be sunk or damaged and told to leave.
And if you land forces on the Iranian side, how do you get them there? How do you sustain them? How do you resupply them? How do you exfiltrate them? You’re going to land them on Iran. It’s desolate, that part of Iran. There are no forests. There are in other parts of Iran, but this is just desolate. And Kharg Island is a very small place. I’ve been to Kharg Island. It is just a small, flat area where the terminal for the pipelines from inside Iran come and load tankers.
If you take it, what is that going to do? And anyway, even if you stop the Iranian oil from flowing to Kharg, then all Iran has to do is to close Hormuz for three, four weeks and the pain in terms of oil price, inflation, markets, valuations, will be felt very quickly. So, it’s going to be very hard to see. This is one of the aspects of these negotiations is the United States has very few cards to play and has one huge disadvantage, which is that ultimately, as we saw in terms of Lebanon, the key player in this is not in Islamabad and that is Israel. And Israel, overall, has been very clear. We follow the Israeli press very closely, the Hebrew press. And their aim in the attack on Lebanon was first of all, to force more time from Trump in order to continue the attack on Hezbollah. Just to be clear, if a few Hezbollah have been killed in this, there been hundreds and altogether many more hundreds of casualties of ordinary Lebanese civilians who have got nothing to do with Hezbollah.
They’re trying to keep it apart by coming to an arrangement with the Prime Minister of Lebanon. That this is a separate issue. We’re going to negotiate the disarmament of Hezbollah with them. Therefore, it’s not part of the issue. And as I say, the Iranian position is very, the equation is very clear. The equation is: it’s a ceasefire on all fronts or it’s a ceasefire on none.
And that’s what they will be saying to the American delegation in Islamabad.
Chris Hedges: Doesn’t Israel seek through Lebanon? Trump initially agreed that a ceasefire in Lebanon was part of the deal, then he had a phone call with Netanyahu and immediately backtracked. I also want to note that when Israel carried out this massive attack, I think over 10 minutes, there was no warning. I think the numbers of civilian dead are up to 2,000. I mean to describe it as a terror attack is probably not far. But it seems that this is Israel’s, and you’re right, Israel is not in Islamabad, but it was also not a party to the ceasefire agreement brokered by Pakistan. Is this Israel’s tool to essentially sabotage any kind of agreement?
Alastair Crooke: Yes, it’s very clear that, and from the Hebrew press it’s expressed. For example, Alon Ben David said, “Of course, you know, the attempt now to insist on the disarmament of Hezbollah is likely to provoke a civil war in Lebanon.” But then adds afterwards, “But that’s been the aim all along.” And similarly, I noticed that, I think it was yesterday, the deadline for the disarmament of Hamas has ended. So, if Israel decides to leave Lebanon quiet for the moment, it’s just as likely that we’re going to see a massive military operation in Gaza and in the West Bank again.
The objective is quite clear when you read the Hebrew press. And these are serious political correspondents. We’ve been following them for years. We know the ones who are close to the leadership and the ones who are in the opposition. And the ones that are close to the leadership are very clear, “We want the war to continue.” And in public opinion, that is also the case. 93 % of the Jewish residents in Israel want the war to continue.
So, this is what is being pursued, how to put the pressure on Trump to continue the war because they want Iran destroyed, not just into some sort of agreement on nuclear issues or something. They want it destroyed. They want to set up a whole series of ethno-sectarian mini-states on it – Baluchi State, Kurdish State, Azeri State, whatever – set them at odds with one another and have a completely weakened Iran. So, Iran is not going to go back into that paradigm. Why should it under any circumstances? They can see that and now they are in the process of trying to make a strategic push, a shift to change that paradigm and to get out of this and to have sanctions lifted.
One of the points of the Hormuz exercise is because people are paying tolls and those tolls are, if you like, breaking the sanctions siege on Iran. And that’s the only way you get your tankers out. And increasingly, states are coming and agreeing and trying to make arrangements with Iran, particularly Asian states. Of course, India and Pakistan, but also South Korea, Japan, they’re all making arrangements to pay the toll and to be able to access energy through Hormuz.
So, I mean it is breaking, in a small way, but breaking the sanctions. But they want sanctions lifted completely. And they are using the Yuan, the imposition of the Yuan, and also the attempt to tell all of the Gulf States that they have now to abandon their close economic ties with the United States if they want to have a relationship with Iran. And it’s not just the American bases, but it’s also the Microsoft, the Amazon, that part of the structure that has created an environment, an economic culture of the whole Gulf which is inimical to Iran.
Chris Hedges: I know this is a difficult question, but how do you read the Trump administration? Do you think that they are aware of how cornered they are?
Alastair Crooke: No. I don’t think so. I think this has been a complete misreading, first of all, of the nature of Iran. I think they thought that Iran was a house of cards and was going to collapse. We saw that very clearly from the New York Times account of the 11th of February meeting, which incidentally is only half the story because we were following in the Hebrew press on the 29th of December when Netanyahu came and had the summit at Mar-a-Lago with Trump, it was there that he laid down very clearly to Trump first and he said, “Forget the nuclear issue. You’re not to pursue that. You have to concentrate on the one issue, we have to end the missiles, end them because the Iranians are not just replacing them, they are creating an entirely new umbrella, a new paradigm. And if it isn’t done, they will be inviable. We won’t be able to attack them again in the future. So, you have to put that as your first priority and not the nuclear issue.” “And if you try to get out of this by doing the nuclear issue,” Netanyahu told him, quote from many sources in the Hebrew press, “We won’t give you a kosher certificate for that. We’re not going to accept another sort of JCPOA type solution. So, and if you don’t have that, you won’t have the support of the right in the United States. So, you have to do this and there has to be this attack on Iran.” And according to all of the newspapers, that was agreed in principle on the 29th of January, well before the 11th of February meeting that the New York Times has described. And again, during that it is clear Trump was convinced this was going to be a very short war, days at most, you know, one weekend, started on Saturday and by the time markets open on Monday, the Supreme Leader would be dead and the whole thing would be moving toward a regime change in Iran And it very clearly hasn’t happened that. In fact, something quite different is happening. It’s very hard to describe this correctly. This isn’t wishful thinking on my part, but it’s quite clear to me that there is a spirit of the Iranian revolution in its new form has come back, particularly amongst the young.
You can see it when Trump threatened to end the Iranian civilization, everyone streamed out onto the bridges, onto the nuclear power station and said, “Okay, here we are. If you’re going to kill us, you kill us.” I mean, this reflects a deep readiness to accept sacrifice, personal sacrifice, in the interests of your community, in the interests of Iran as Iran, a civilization, a symbol of civilization. So, there is a powerful thing, particularly amongst the young people now. They are much more fired up after the killing of the Supreme Leader and much more fired up. Young women, boys, men, it is something that is quite important and in my belief is having an effect not just in the region, which it is, the success of Iran in this period, but in Russia and I’m told in China too.
The Chinese thought Iran would manage, but they’ve been quite surprised at the success that Iran has had and its planning, its thinking, and the asymmetric war that they’ve been planning for two decades. So, it’s having an effect in China and in Russia too.
Chris Hedges: Just as a footnote, we should add that the Persian civilization is 7,000 years old. It’s lasted a lot longer than the American experiment. But does the Trump administration, at this point in Islamabad, realize that they don’t have many options left? That Iran is basically holding all the cards? Or do you think that they are foolish enough to get sucked back into a resumption of the war?
Alastair Crooke: I think, first of all, the most important element in this, of course, is Israel because it is quite likely that Israel will pursue the war. Whether it will do it first of all by Lebanon or whether it will do it in Gaza or it will do it directly, but as far as they’re concerned, the war is unfinished business.
Now, this is a paradox, a real paradox, because at the same time that I’m saying 93 % pursue and support war on Iran and the destruction of Iran in the polls. It’s even higher on the right, this is an average, the 93%. At same time I’m saying that there are signs of great distress inside Israel too. The chief of staff of the army has said, “IDF is on the point of collapsing.” He went to the last security cabinet meeting and he said, “I’ve got 10 red lights for you gentlemen because we cannot survive with this. We are losing heavily, many men in Lebanon.” They had, in that very short period they were there, nearly 100 Merkava were destroyed.
Chris Hedges: This is the Israeli battle tank you’re referring to.
Alastair Crooke: Yes, sorry, the main battle tank and many of them with their crew. Some crew got up, many did not. They’re losing troops when they tried to invade and form a buffer line in Lebanon. They were routed.
There is a new Hezbollah. It has gone dark. You don’t see it. The Israelis complain they’re like ghosts. They appear and they vanish and you don’t see them again. They’ve evolved. They’ve changed it and they fire their missiles straight across to Tel Aviv. So, there’s a big fight in Israel because the defense minister wants a buffer line. They want to level all the houses for 7-8 km in the south of Lebanon, just destroy them like Gaza, and have that as a buffer line. And the defense staff say to him, “This is stupid. What are you doing this for because Hezbollah has most of its missile capacity north of the Litani?” The Litani is a river that divides Lebanon about just less than halfway to the North and they have them north of it. The South has always been seen as more of Shia preserve.
And this is where the crisis is. On the one hand, the population wants the war to go on. On the other hand, the military side in Israel are saying very clearly, “We have achieved none of our objectives in Iran. We haven’t seen the state collapse. It wasn’t a house of cards. We don’t believe there can be a color revolution in Iran. We haven’t ended the nuclear process. We haven’t got the enriched uranium back. We haven’t caused any real damage. They still are able to fire missiles at us regularly and with very damaging effects. So, we have failed in Iran. And we have failed clearly. We all thought that Hezbollah had been completely decapacitated by the killing of its leadership and Hassan Nasrallah. And now we find that, actually, they’ve emerged even more effectively than they were. Very effective, new leaders and new structures. And in Gaza, who’s running Gaza? It’s Hamas still running Gaza, and they are re-equipping and they are re-preparing for another conflict with Iran. So, all of this has failed and there’s going to be no grand victory.”
So, there is this great confrontation, and it could be that it is Israel that calls for a ceasefire first, just as they did in the ‘12 Day War, after four days started asking for it. So, it’s possible because of the strains and the strains on ordinary people. Yes, they support the destruction of Iran wholeheartedly, yet they are not ready to go on going down to the shelters and spend every night for 10 hours in a shelter, day after day after day, and so the strains on the civil population are great.
So, I can’t give you a very simple answer as to what’s going to happen from all of this, but don’t forget there are elections coming up. And Netanyahu still has a court case which is about to resume, I think, tomorrow, and he has to win these elections to avoid the outcome of the court case, which might mean imprisonment. And so, he’s desperate to keep the war in Iran going, to keep the fantasy now or the imaginary victory of a war in Iran. And partly that was what he was doing in Lebanon. He is saying, “Look, okay, we haven’t won against Hezbollah, but look, we can really hit them. And we hit them.”
So, it’s very complicated, the situation in Israel, as a consequence, and very complicated in the United States. I mean, I’m speaking to you from Europe and you’re in the United States, but you will well understand. I mean, the problem is that Trump needs to clear the decks if he can before the summer because the midterm elections are coming. The economic situation could turn very nasty. As I say, within even three weeks, the supply line shortages may show up. The price of oil is still high, the price of gasoline is high and so an economic crisis in the debt markets or elsewhere, because we know very clearly that there’s been a huge move out of the dollar, people seeking other forms of secure assets at this uncertain time. Certainly, we see that in the Gulf. I mean, much of the money has been moving out of the Gulf but not back into the dollar, it’s been moving into Yuan and going to China. And Russia has been pursuing this and telling the Europeans, “If you want any Russian oil or gas, you have to pay in Yuan.”
And now European banks are not giving Panda loans. Deutsche Bank, a major bank, is now saying, “Well, we’re not giving dollar loans. Now we are issuing bonds. Panda bonds in Yuan, either a digital Yuan or classical Yuan.” And things are changing and the process geopolitically is shifting. And Iran is gradually, in its small way, emphasizing and working on these rifts in the geopolitical structures to gain leverage for their main demand, which is, “We want the paradigm over. We’ve had 48 years of being in a cage and we are breaking out.”
Chris Hedges: If the ceasefire talks break down, how likely do you think it is that the United States will resume its aerial campaign against Iran?
Alastair Crooke: From what I understand, the Iranians don’t think that America is about to resume the war. America. They think Israel is a different case. But they don’t think America is likely to resume the war because they don’t really have any cards to play. Already, the Iranians have pushed the naval assets 1,000 kilometers from the coastline by firing drones as warning and pushing. So, the carriers have been pushed beyond the range of their deck strike aircraft to be able to overfly Iran without refueling, and you can’t refuel over your target. It’s not an advisible thing to do. They pushed that up. They’ve destroyed most of the bases in the Gulf states. Heavy damage. The radar systems have been destroyed. Some of the AWACS have been disabled.
So, apart from the ability to just simply blindly bombard basically civil infrastructure – houses, residences, hospitals and things like that – in Tehran and elsewhere, all, by the way, not necessarily by aircraft flying over it because they largely don’t, these are standoff weapons, cruise missiles, others that are used to do these attacks. So, what’s really left to the United States militarily to do that would be a game changer? What? Bomb again Nantaz?
The only thing that is particularly worrying is in this period, Nantaz, the nuclear facilities that was bombed in June by President Trump, has been bombed again by Israel. But Israel has also put into a missile very close to Bushehr. And just so your viewers are clear about it, Bushehr is a working nuclear-powered power plant, which is a joint venture with Russia. So, it’s half-staffed with Russians. About, I think, 135 of them have now been withdrawn. But then there was another missile, which actually hit Bushehr. Not much damage, a little damage. But what’s the signal coming from Israel, from that, on the nuclear target? And I think the signal is not so much to Iran, but to the United States.
Chris Hedges: And what are they saying to the US?
Alastair Crooke: Keep the war up or else we might decide that we are going to resort to practical nuclear weapons.
Chris Hedges: All right. Great. Thank you, Alastair.
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