As diplomacy sets in there will have to be compromises. Might this be one?
Geoffrey Roberts is Emeritus Professor of History at University College Cork and a member of the Royal Irish Academy
1. Security not Territory. Putin has stated time and again that the Ukraine war is
about Russia’s security, not the acquisition of territory, and has repeatedly
said he is prepared to negotiate and make compromises to end the conflict.
The Trump administration has signalled that concessions by Putin on the
territorial issue will be key to making a deal. No Ukrainian government will
voluntarily concede more territory and Trump will not relish being seen to
capitulate to all Putin’s territorial demands. Something has to give. The extent
of the compromise will depend on the situation on the battlefield at the time
of any ceasefire. Putin won’t give up any Russian-controlled territory in the
four provinces but he may be prepared to forego additional gains for the sake
of a peace deal with Trump.
2. Russian Lives Matter. Russia’s armed forces have suffered at least 150,000
irrecoverable losses. To capture all the territory formally incorporated by the
Russian Federation in October 2022 would require crossing the Dnieper in
order to re-take Kherson City as well as an assault on the 700,000-strong
capital of Zaporozhe and the capture of an array of large and heavily fortified
targets such as Pokrovsk, Konstantinokva, Slavyansk and Siversk. Thousands,
perhaps tens of thousands, Russian soldiers would be killed, even in the best-
case scenario of Ukrainian regime and military collapse.
3.The Limits of Liberation. As the Russian army advances westward it will
increasingly occupy territory with fewer Russian speakers and ever more
Ukrainians who do not want to be part of Russia. A military campaign to
occupy all the four provinces’ territory will progressively transform from a war
of liberation into one of conquest – and into an occupation that may meet
popular resistance whose quelling could require a prolonged Russian counter-
insurgency campaign
4. Coalition warfare. Putin’s BRICS and Global South allies will not welcome an
extended war of territorial conquest. Their support has been vital to Russia’s
success in the proxy war with the West and they expect their ally, partner and friend to accept a reasonable compromise in order to end the war as soon as possible.
5. Thwarting Europe’s Warmongers. European leaders will be jubilant if
American-Russian negotiations break down because of a failure to
compromise on territorial issues. It would be the wedge they have been
desperately seeking to drive between Trump and Putin.
6. Victorious Sufficiency. While Russia’s hardliners will accept nothing less than
the total conquest of Ukraine, most Russians will accept a less radical
outcome, as long as it protects their country’s security. A sufficient, if not
glorious, victory would be retention of all or nearly all Donbass, of the Black
Sea coastal lands of Kherson and Zaporozhe, and security for Crimea.
Crucially, where Putin leads, enough of the Russian public will follow.
7. Enduring Peace. A negotiated end to the war would facilitate the achievement
of a stable and durable peace that will enable Russia, as well as Ukraine, to
recover from the war, including the reconstruction of the two countries’ own
relationship. Beyond that peace lies the prize of an American-Russian détente
leading, perhaps, to a global security compact between all the world’s great
powers – the underpinning for Putin’s grand vision of an international society
of sovereign states that balances the power, rights, responsibilities, values
and interests of all its members.
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