Zero-sum geopolitics is in vogue, but in the long-term none of the major powers win from chaos and failed states.
Anatol Lieven is Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
Cross-posted from Responsible Statecraft
The fall of the Baath state in Syria is a serious defeat for Russia (and a disaster for Iran). It would however be a grave mistake to assume that this by necessity makes it a success for the United States.
Moscow and Washington may indeed now face similar challenges in Syria.
Three issues led Russia to intervene in the Syrian civil war to save the Assad regime. First was a general desire to preserve a partner state — one of the very few remaining to Russia after the U.S. overthrow of the regimes in Iraq and Libya, which helped to prop up Moscow’s international influence. Second was a desire to retain Russia’s only naval and air bases in the Mediterranean.
Third was a deep Russian fear that an Islamist victory would lead to Syria becoming a base for terrorism against Russia and its partners in Central Asia. That anxiety was increased by the presence of numerous fighters from Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia in the ranks of the Islamist forces in Syria and Iraq.
Moscow’s hope of preserving a partner state has now irredeemably collapsed. As to the terrorist threat, we will have to see. Given the huge challenges it will face in rebuilding the Syrian state, it would seem insane for the new regime led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to sponsor international terrorism; and, as part of his general strategy of disowning his Al Qaeda past, its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has promised not to do this.
There will, however, be a question mark over HTS’s ability to control its allies, and some of its own followers. In Afghanistan, the Taliban promised not to back international terrorism when they returned to power, and have apparently kept their word. The Afghanistan-based Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), however, continues to do so; and from some mixture of weak control over parts of Afghanistan and unwillingness to engage in new conflict, the Taliban have not been able fully to prevent this.
This leaves the issue of the Russian naval base at Tartus and air base near Latakia. The Russian squadron based at Tartus has reportedly left the port. This could be either a definitive evacuation or a precautionary move to keep them out to sea until relations with the new regime are clarified. The Russian air base is said to be surrounded by HTS forces, but has not been attacked. It is reported that there has been a deal between Moscow and HTS to guarantee the security of the bases, but, if so, this arrangement may be purely temporary.
Given the extremely complicated and uncertain nature of its relations with all Syria’s neighbors, it might make good sense for the new regime in Damascus to allow the bases to remain (perhaps in return for Russian supplies of oil and food) in order to balance its diplomatic and economic options.
This issue however is intimately tied up with that of the new regime’s policy towards Syria’s ethno-religious minorities, which generally supported the Baath regime out of fear of Sunni Islamist oppression (a fear amply justified by the savage fate of their communities in Syria and Iraq which fell to ISIS).
Where Russia’s bases are situated along the Mediterranean coast lies the heartland of Syria’s Christian and Alawite minorities. The Assad dynasty came from the Alawites, a Shia sect, and, for the past 50 years, the Baath state in Syria has been to a great extent an Alawite one. Alawite militias played a crucial role on the government side in the civil war, and inflicted numerous atrocities on their opponents.
Al-Jolani has promised that there must be no revenge for this, that minority rights will be respected, and that there will be no imposition of severe Sunni Islamist law. Even if he is sincere about these pledges, however, his followers may feel differently.
An HTS-led regime in Damascus that wishes to reassure the Alawites and Christians might see an interest in allowing the Russian bases to remain. A regime fearful of minority revolt (and outside backing for such revolt), however, would likely see the Russian bases as potential support for such rebellion.
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