Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert.
Cross-posted from Responsible Statecraft
Amid questions of the over-militarization of U.S. foreign policy and the illusion of global primacy, the European Union is charging headlong in the opposite direction, appearing to be eagerly grasping for an American-esque primacist role.
Last month, the European Commission, the EU’s executive body, proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a part of the EU’s sweeping, $900 billion rearmament plans. This ambition, driven by elites in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Warsaw rather than broad support from Europe’s diverse populations, reflects a dangerous delusion: that, in the face of a purported U.S. retreat, the EU has to overtake the mantle as leading defender of the “rules-based liberal world order.”
Not everybody in the EU is on board though. Countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and Spain are known for their less than enthusiastic embrace of the rearmament fervor. Last week, a voice of dissent came from the European Parliament, elected directly by the EU citizens — unlike the Commission.
The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs unanimously rejected the legal basis proposed by the Commission for SAFE, namely Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This is more than just an arcane legal-technocratic detail: Article 122 allows the Commission to invoke urgency to bypass the European Parliament and secure approval for its proposals with only a qualified majority in the Council. As the foreign policy decisions are taken by consensus, the purpose of this maneuver is to eliminate potential vetoes from skeptical member countries.
Historically used for crises like COVID-19, this procedure is now being weaponized by Commission hawks, led by Ursula von der Leyen, its president, to operationalize the “rearm” concept. Von der Leyen, alongside High Representative for Foreign Policy Kaja Kallas, a former prime minister of Estonia, has leaned on alarmist rhetoric, exaggerating external threats — particularly from Russia — to justify this rush. This fear-driven narrative pressures all member states to align with a Russia-centric security agenda, often at odds with their own priorities: it is true that Russia is undeniably perceived as a serious threat in the Baltic states and Poland, hence support for hardline policies, but Hungary and Slovakia, on the contrary, have long advocated for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. And Spain and Italy treat migration and failing states in the southern Mediterranean, not Russia, as their main security risks.
Yet the Commission’s move represents a significant overreach, sidelining the Parliament and potentially some member states, a process that undermines democracy. By invoking urgency, the Commission seeks to fast-track SAFE without the scrutiny required for such a transformative shift. The Legal Committee’s rejection of that route highlights the Commission’s failure to justify this urgency or explain why alternative legal routes were ignored.
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