The inexorable defeat of the Ukrainian army
Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an expert analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com
Cross-posted from Russian & Eurasian Politics
Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are now well into a state of collapse, as I warned would be the case a year ago (https://gordonhahn.com/2024/12/10/the-second-great-ukrainian-ruin-revisited/). It is plagued by high casualties, low recruitment, almost all it forced, mass desertion, low morale, poor training, and old age. It is becoming a rag-tag force calling to mind those famous paintings of Napoleon’s Grande Army during its retreat from Russia.
Desertions and AWOLs from the Ukrainian military amounted to 90,000 from January 2022 to September 2024: 60,000 cases of AWOL and nearly 30,000 for desertion. By September 2025 those figures had risen to nearly 290,000 AWOLs and desertions: 235,646 AWOLs and 53,954 desertions (https://censor.net/en/news/3579670/ukraine-opens-nearly-290-000-awol-and-desertion-cases-since-2022). In October, desertions alone reached a record 21,602 (https://censor.net/en/news/3583784/ukraine-sets-a-record-for-desertions-more-than-21-000-people-left-the-army-in-a-month). Some conclude that the UAF may have suffered as many as 2 million casualties (https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WMkYYjvnyOI).?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0)
I would estimate Ukrainian casualties at 1.5 million to date; Russian casualties are likely a third of that approximately. With casualties up to some 40,000 per month and the current AWOL/desertion rate of 20,000, the UAF will have shrunk by 720,000 and may no longer exist a year from now. Mobilization may not make up the gap, unless the Ukrainian army currently numbers nearly that many. This may be the case but if so then just barely. There are reportedly now few to no volunteers in Ukraine, and military mobilization carried out the past two year, which has had such a debilitating effect on the economy and society, has been an unmitigated failure. It has devolved into a throwback from medieval times, with men forcibly ‘mobilized’ into the army. Nevertheless, if we are to be positive and optimistic from Ukraine’s point of view and assume 20,000 recruits per month — many if not all forcibly mobilized – Ukraine will have an army by the end of next year of some 240,000. But his will be an army not only of less quantity but of less quality by that time.
Moreover, the recruting pool is shrinking. Almost 100,000 draft age young men fled Ukraine in the first two months after Zelenskiy approved in summer an easing of travel restrictions for men aged 18-22 (www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/10/29/100000-young-men-flee-ukraine-two-months/). This figure is now probably at 150,000. Thus, mobilization has not been and will not be able to replace losses due to casualties, AWOLs, and desertions and merely. Thus, the UAF is retreating all along the front line, only recently in controlled ‘retrograde’ retreat to spare lives and at other times in uncontrolled fashion, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskii, commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, had no choice but to order withdrawal from Gulai Pole precisely because the UAF has no more reserves to deploy there to make a stand against the advancing Russian troops (https://t.me/rezident_ua/28080).
Ukraine is only able to ‚fill‘ the ranks with completely inexperienced recruits with low to no morale, who are thrown at the front lines without training (https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/r8yMTGKURYU?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0). But already last year almost all new recruits were old or unmotivated, The Economistreported (https://ctrana.one/news/475629-nekhvatka-soldat-v-vsu-stanet-kritichnoj-vesnoj-the-economist.html). Commanders report that 90 percent of their troops on there frontlines are new, coercively mobilised men (https://ctrana.news/news/475190-v-vsu-sejchas-vojujut-v-osnovnom-zhiteli-sel-horodskim-lehche-sprjatatsja-ot-ttsk.html). Two days after Zelenskiy claimed Kiev’s forces had ‘all under control’ in Pokrovsk, which was fully encircled and almost entirely occupied by Russian forces, a Ukrainian officer reflected the state of morale. Criticizing the civilian and militreay leadership, he noted that the Russians have a three-to-one numerical advantage in terms of soldiers and drones. He lamented: “As soon as we destroy a group of ten soldiers, another one immediately takes their place. Are we destroying the drone post? He appears somewhere else. Their resources seem to be inexhaustible” (https://t.me/stranaua/215649). According to Serhiy Rakhamanin, a member of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Defense and National Security, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ infantry brigades now suffer from a shortage of personnel, are exhausted, and have low morale. Infantry units are suffering heavy losses, with no reserves to replace them. Many commanders fail to report losses in an attempt to profit from them. This means that, although unit personnel are said to be 60-70% strength full-time, they actually stand at less than 15-20%. Defensive missions assume what does not exis: fully or nearly fully staffed units. Thus, settlements now are being abandoned within hours after initial Russian attack. There is no viable defense force from infantry, and in some cases, drones are unable to build defense zones (https://t.me/Slavyangrad/148450).
With morale low, discipline is eroded. Unauthorised retreats are increasing in frequency. Ukrainians soldiers are refusing to carry out operational orders because they amount to suicide operations and are beginning to surrender as whole units, in one case nearly a full battalion (e.g., 92nd Combat). Indeed, refusals to follow orders or undertake counteroffensive measures are increasing. In one recent case, the Azov Brigade’s chief of staff, Bogdan Koretich, accused a Ukrainian general of such poor command that he was described of being responsible for more Ukrainian war dead than the Russians, forcing his removal (www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/06/24/7462293/). At lower levels, commanders are being fired in large numbers (https://strana.news/news/467266-itohi-852-dnja-vojny-v-ukraine.html).
Furthermore, Ukrainian weapons production is low, as is that of, and weapons assistance from Kiev’s allies. Russian forces have been destroying military production sites, including drone production and operator centers, while effectively cutting off supply lines, leaving troops poorly trained and poorly motivated troops poorly armed as well particularly as compared to their Russian enemy.
The military crisis is sparking conflict between the army and civilian command, as President Volodomyr Zelenskiy has refused to issue a retreat order for political reasons, while the high command sees the decline in the number of ‘human resources’ for the war and is seeking to preserve lives. The military intervened to put an end to Zelenskiy’s politicking last month.On November 7th, as Pokrovsk was falling to Russian forces after Zelenskiy refused to order a troop withdrawal and said Ukrainian forces had the city under control, Chief of the General Staff of the UAF, Gen. Andrey Gnatov stated to Zelenskiy’s face and on video that “All decision touching on this (the Pokrovsk) operation will be taken by the military command,” forcing Zelenskiy to cut him off and inject that any rapid fall of Pokrovsk would be fodder for Russian propaganda and damage Ukraine’s ability to garner Western support (https://strana.news/news/494462-putin-mozhet-ispolzovat-zakhvat-pokrovska-kak-povod-ubedit-zapad-nadavit-na-kiev.html). Zelenskiy has repeatedly refused to give withdrawal orders to Ukrainian troops, allowing them to be pounded by Russian artillery, drones, and rockets for far too long and then be surrounded and largely ‘liquidated’, if not captured or forced to surrender to Russian forces. This was true of Mariupol in May 2022, Bakhmut in May 2023, Avdiivka in February 2024, and many other lesser battles in the war; a fact that often consternated the military leadership. Now, with the military forced into insubordination and taking charge of retreat decisions, civilian control over the military is under threat. This cannot only split the military from the civilian leadership, but it can create divisions within the army by provoking finger-pointing and disputes among officers over the need to follow the civilian leadership’s commands or whether high military command ought to continue to subordinate itself to the politicians. With this, a military coup can be one but one battlefield rout or political corruption scandal away.
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