“The reality is complex. Finland’s decision, NATO’s expansion, Russian reactions, and even the theories used to explain them are all part of one continuous, evolving process”
Heikki Patomäki is Professor of World Politics and Global Political Economy at the University of Helsinki
When Finland joined NATO in 2023, the decision was widely understood as a necessary response to danger and a step to increase security by strengthening deterrence. This interpretation may have appeared convincing because a common way of thinking about security is mechanical: more military capability equals more safety. One’s decisions, policies, and military capabilities have no impact on the world. However, the reality is complex. Finland’s decision, NATO’s expansion, Russian reactions, and even the theories used to explain them are all part of one continuous, evolving process. There is no outside vantage point. There is no clean separation between action and interpretation. Everything is connected.
Why the mechanical deterrence theory does not work
From the perspective of mechanical deterrence theory, Finland’s NATO membership strengthens the alliance. Finland brings a large reserve army, strong territorial defence, and deep expertise in operating in northern conditions. This improves NATO’s deterrence posture, especially along its border with Russia and at the same time, NATO’s deterrence strengthens Finland’s security. It may seem like a win-win situation.
However, even within deterrence theory itself, the literature has become highly qualified, internally contested, and multifaceted. Since the works of Thomas Schelling and others, it has been understood that deterrence is not a mechanical material condition but involves (often limited or restricted) communication under uncertainty.
To make deterrence credible, states may need to appear willing to act irrationally or create automatic escalation mechanisms. Any game of brinkmanship increases uncertainty and the likelihood of actual war. Moreover, the same action can either deter or provoke, depending on context. State and alliance leaders rely on simplified mental models. They interpret signals through biases and prior beliefs, and often they see what they expect to see.
Another consideration is that deterrence does not simply “reduce conflict”. Rather, it redistributes it. For example, during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence may have reduced the likelihood of total war, but it increased the likelihood of limited conflicts and proxy wars. (I should add that even though nuclear deterrence may have reduced the likelihood of total war, the probability of total destruction in a nuclear war was nonetheless high; in my estimation, the Cold War was like humanity playing two rounds of Russian roulette).
Security is not a thing – it is a process
More deeply, security is relational and processual. It emerges from interactions. As Finland has joined NATO and started a military build-up, Russia does not simply observe this neutrally. It interprets, reacts, and adjusts. Those adjustments are then interpreted by NATO, leading to further responses. What looks like a purely defensive move from one side can appear threatening from the other. This is the essence of the so-called security dilemma.
Finland’s NATO membership does not simply “add security” to the system. It changes relationships. It alters expectations. It reshapes how different actors understand one another and what they believe will happen next.
Russia does not experience NATO expansion as a neutral fact. It interprets it through its own historical experience, prevailing strategic culture, and dominant political narratives. NATO, in turn, interprets Russia’s reactions as confirmation of a threat. These interpretations are not secondary but part of reality. They influence risk-assessments, decisions, and deployments. In other words, (in)security is not a stable condition. It is continuously reproduced or transformed through interactions.
A spiral that produces itself
From this perspective, Finland’s accession to NATO is not just a response to insecurity. It is also a moment that contributes to the further production of insecurity. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland faced a radically altered situation. Joining NATO was a way to reduce vulnerability. But that same move feeds into a broader dynamic in which each side’s attempt to become safer is interpreted by the other as a potential threat.
This creates a self-reinforcing pattern:
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One side acts to increase its security
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The other side interprets this as a threat and responds
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The response is then seen as confirmation of danger
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Further measures are taken
This is not a future possibility. It is already happening. Russia has begun adjusting its military posture and strategic thinking in response to Finland’s membership, even though its attention remains focused on Ukraine and elsewhere for the time being. NATO, for its part, is integrating Finland into its planning and infrastructure.
The key point is that the process does not wait. It begins immediately at the level of expectations and interpretations, then gradually becomes embedded in military preparations, which are subsequently interpreted in accordance with prevailing theories and narratives.
Why the usual debate falls short
Discussions about NATO expansion have been polarised. One side maintains that countries are free to join alliances and that any way of strengthening our side’s deterrence increases the chances of peace. Others have warned time and again that expansion fuels escalation.
While I tend to see the latter perspective as closer to the truth, from a genuinely relational and ontologically realist standpoint, this opposition, especially if taken as categorical, is false. These are not simply two separate effects that can be weighed against each other. Different interpretations and responses are parts of the same process.
What is seen as “deterrence” on one side appears as “threat” to the other. What looks like “stability” in one context contributes to “instability” in another. The same action can produce apparently contrary effects simultaneously, because it operates within a system of mutual interpretation and response. No interpretation or action is outside the overall process.
All actions can have both intended and unintended consequences. Even the critics of deterrence theory admit that, under some (rare) circumstances and given multiple conditions for successful communication, plus a bit of luck, deterrence can reduce the likelihood of aggression by the opposing side, at least for a period of time.
All this means that the main question is not whether Finland’s NATO membership increases or decreases security in some absolute or mechanical sense. The question is how it reconfigures the dynamics through which security and insecurity are produced together.
The uncertainties and paradoxes of joining NATO
Finland’s decision to join NATO was a response shaped by circumstances. The turn in public opinion in early 2022 stemmed from the perception that the existing security environment had become more uncertain and dangerous. This perception was not wrong as such, as the invasion of Ukraine was an aggressive move on the part of Russia. Thus, in a plausible interpretation, joining may have been locally rational but globally counterproductive, reinforcing a dynamic that increases the overall risk of a major conflict.
Recent developments have, however, called into question the immediate local rationality of joining NATO, even if the matter is viewed only from a narrow mechanical perspective. It seems increasingly likely that the NATO framework itself will become unreliable or fragment as a consequence of the words and deeds of the Trump II administration.
Even assuming the full disintegration of NATO remains a low probability despite shocks such as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, there is a likely erosion of the credibility of (extended) NATO deterrence. For Finland, this likely means it bears the costs of membership (being seen as actively and willingly engaging with a hostile bloc, employing militarisation, and implementing a closed, hardened border) but may not fully, or even partly, receive the promised and assumed benefits (reliable collective defence). In such an increasingly likely short-term scenario, Finland will face a strong mismatch between exposure and protection.
What now?
The disintegrative tendencies within NATO further intensify the acuteness of the question “what should Finland do now that it has joined NATO?”. How to act within the overall relational process without intensifying its dangerous tendencies? And how to counter such tendencies?
How should Finland position itself within the alliance? It could emphasise a defensive orientation by avoiding steps that might be interpreted as preparing for offensive operations. This does not eliminate tension, but it shapes how others read actions. The effort currently underway to change the Nuclear Energy Act and enable the bringing of American nuclear weapons to Finland is exactly the opposite course of action. The current Finnish nuclear weapons gesturing serves to maximise provocation.
Another issue is how Finland engages in internal NATO debates. Alliances are not uniform. They contain disagreements about strategy, risk, and long-term goals. Finland could support efforts
that reduce the likelihood of further escalation with Russia (and its allies or supporters), such as opening and maintaining communication channels and limiting unnecessary military signalling. Again, the current Finnish government seems to be doing the exact opposite.
Consistency is also crucial. If the basic principles of international law are applied selectively, they lose their authority. Consistency does not remove conflicts from world politics, but it affects how actions are interpreted and whether norms and the UN system retain any credibility. The blatant contradiction between strongly condemning Russia while condoning US and Israeli aggression is detrimental to whatever little remains of the “rules-based” system.
Finally, there is the question of how rigid the system becomes. The greatest danger may not be tension itself, but the hardening of expectations. When each side comes to see the other as a permanent, unchangeable threat, typically because the other side is perceived as essentially evil, escalation becomes easier and de-escalation more difficult. Even under severely constrained circumstances, it would be possible to act in ways that keep some degree of openness and flexibility, though this is not the current course of action.
Conclusion
Finland’s NATO accession was a response to increased uncertainty about Russia’s future behaviour, not to an immediate military threat. It was a precautionary strategy whose rationality depends heavily on how one evaluates the overall, long-term relational process.
The decision to join NATO has deepened Finland’s involvement in complex global security dynamics that centre on the escalation of the Russia-West conflict that has now continued for a quarter of a century. Finland’s accession to NATO has changed the alliance, but not in a simple way. The accession has shaped the broader process in which military capabilities, strategic ideas, and political interpretations continually interact. In this process, attempts to increase security cannot be separated from the responses they co-generate.
For Finland, the problem is made even more acute given the disintegrative tendencies within NATO. The current aim should be to reduce risk rather than amplify it. This includes establishing communication mechanisms, trust- and confidence-building measures, and non-military approaches to security. Moreover, the conventional wisdom that the common rules and institutions of the world system are in the best interests of all, and especially smaller actors, remains true. Among other things, this means that if an actor supports international law and condemns violations in one context, it should apply the same standards elsewhere.
The task is to act within the overall relational process as carefully as possible: to avoid locking in rigid patterns of hostility, to maintain space for interpretation and dialogue, and to recognise that security is not something one side can achieve alone. This, of course, points toward the concept of common security, which is the basic principle of the OSCE. The task of future governments is to revive the spirit of Helsinki – unless it is then already too late.
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