Matthew Blackburn – Flirting with disaster: Ukraine’s imprudent Kursk gambit and the next phase of the war

Matthew Blackburn is Senior Researcher for the Research group on Russia, Asia and International Trade at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast’ has produced some spectacular optics. The headlines spoke of “the first major invasion of Russian territory since World War Two” and Putin’s “fury” or “humiliation”. Western journalists rode with Ukrainian soldiers into Russia. Ukrainian flags were raised on Russian territory. Ukraine’s bold surprise operation certainly exposed some Russian vulnerabilities and provided a boost to Ukrainian morale in the short term. However, the claim that “Putin is paralysed in crisis” due to the Kursk incursion is obviously overblown. Kyiv’s stated military and strategic aims with the operation strain credulity; its short to medium-term situation has not dramatically improved. In fact, the Kursk gambit is more in service of political goals, such as convincing Western audiences that Russia is weak and encouraging NATO to deepen its involvement in the conflict. Kyiv’s plan is to cause a temporary destabilisation of Russia through the reckless transgression of redlines, which would put them in a stronger position for a future negotiated end to the conflict.

In the meantime, the Kursk incursion looks unpromising in strategic and military levels. The operation was about “destroying the logistics of the Russian army and draining their reserves (…) to inflict maximum damage on all Russian positions”. It was hoped loss of territory and face would force Russia to divert forces from the Donbass to Kursk Oblast’. Russia has not taken the bait and deployed other reserves– albeit slowly. The 30,000 troops Russia has sent to Kursk are not from Donbass. As a result, Russia’s best combat troops remain in the East and advance on the strategically critical town of Pokrovsk, a transport and logistics centre whose fall could endanger Ukraine’s long-held defensive lines in Donetsk Oblast’.

Instead of deploying forces to hold Pokrovsk, Kyiv has sent 10-15,000 combat-hardened troops into Kursk Oblast’, a sparsely populated region that has little obvious strategic value. Kyiv’s has declared it has created a “buffer zone”, which suggests Ukrainian forces plan to hold the territory. In the context of a war of attrition in which Ukraine has far less men and material, why have they opened a new front? Now bogged down in Kursk Oblast’ and exposed to Russian artillery, missile and drone attacks, Ukrainian forces are exposed to attrition on an additional sector. Ukraine has deployed scarce air defence systems to the Kursk sector, leaving the rest of the country more vulnerable to devastating attacks on its energy system, as shown in Russia’s massive August 26 missile strikes. In military terms, a Ukrainian withdrawal from Kursk to regroup and attack elsewhere, makes intuitive sense. However, in political terms, this would be hard to sell after the recent presentation of Ukraine’s territorial gains in Russia as a victory.

The third aim of the Kursk incursion relates to diplomacy. Presidential aide Mikhail Podolyak claimed Ukraine’s position is now stronger in future negotiations; Zelensky refers to an “exchange fund” of captured land and POWs in Kursk Oblast’. However, it hard to see how seizing territory in Kursk Oblast’ suddenly puts Kyiv in the driving seat in negotiations. What Russia is taking in the Donbass is far more valuable in strategic and economic terms. Furthermore, the Kursk offensive has intensified Russian enmity and essentially reduced the prospects of negotiations. The Washington Post reported that indirect talks between Russian and Ukraine, scheduled to take place in Qatar this month, were cancelled. Moscow denies any such plans existed. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov declared “the topic of negotiations” has “lost its relevance”. The negotiation stances of Ukraine and Russia have been turned upside down; Moscow is now refusing negotiations while Kyiv is signalling its readiness.

While the strategic, military and diplomatic goals of the Kursk incursion are unlikely to improve Ukraine’s position, it can advance two political objectives with more chances of success. The first is to destabilise Russia by sowing chaos and confusion with a surprise attack on a poorly defended sector of the front. With the evacuation of citizens and a declaration of a state of emergency in the border oblasts, the narrative of Russian weakness, corruption, and incompetence is back with a vengeance. Putin is embarrassed and the Russian military is not all powerful. This is a compelling and appealing message for many in the West, however it is unlikely to be perceived as such by most Russians.

Similar headlines exaggerating Russian destabilisation have been heard throughout the war. The Kursk incursion is not more dramatic than previous battlefield reverses in Kharkov or Kherson, the announcement partial mobilisation, Prigozhin’s bizarre mutiny or the Crocus City Hall terror attacks. Meanwhile, Russian state media can use the Kursk attack to reinforce the claim that Ukraine is a NATO-armed Russophobic Western proxy that takes pleasure in killing Russian civilians. Without the slightest irony, Russian official discourse now calls Ukrainians “occupiers” and “terrorists”. While this will be derided in the West, this message may find more receptive audiences in the Global South. By invading sovereign Russian territory, Ukraine has abandoned its position, established in May 2022, to fight solely on Ukrainian sovereign territory. Now Moscow will tell the world that Ukraine is doing what they have claimed all along – using Western weapons and money to build an offensive capacity that is an existential threat to Russia’s security.

The second political aim of the incursion is to advertise Ukraine’s continued fighting capabilities and lobby for a free hand on using Western-supplied long-range missiles deep in Russian territory. The call to “untie Kyiv’s hands” and greenlight strikes deep into Russian territory is not new; it has been heard across 2024. What is different is that this permission should have an offensive rationale, i.e. to assist Ukrainian ground offensives inside Russia. Most ominously, the Kursk operation is used as evidence that Russia’s redlines can be crossed without consequence. As Zelensky put it “the naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines (…) has crumbled apart in these days.” Thus, we return to the claim that if the West gives Kyiv a free hand and ignores Russia’s redlines, Ukraine will improve its military position and Moscow, cowards that they are, will do nothing.

It is well-known that long-range strike systems such as Taurus and Storm Shadow are manned by NATO member specialists. The Russian defence Minister Belousov had direct talks with his American counterpart in June this year after a Ukranian strike killed civilians on a Crimean beach. It is likely he warned of Russian reprisals in case of deeper strikes. Multiple strikes on the critical infrastructure and military bases of a nuclear power by NATO-operated systems in Ukraine would be an escalation without precedent in any of the proxy conflicts of the last Cold War. Yet, the pressure to do just this is growing to feverish levels in the West.

In the aftermath of Russia’s devasting 26 August energy strikes, Zelensky claimed such “vile attacks” were only possible because “the world allows” this by restricting Ukraine’s right to fire on targets inside Russia. A Politico article had revealed a few days earlier that US, Ukrainian and European officials are pressuring the Biden administration to remove all restrictions. This pushes a moral binary on Western leaders: either lift restrictions on Ukraine and be “good” or “betray” Ukraine causing the “evil” of its defeat. Washington still shows no sign of changing its position and it is unlikely Biden will reverse his stance before leaving office. In contrast to the pro-Ukraine twitter mobs, Washington is not prepared to go to the brink of World War Three for this issue.

With its Kursk gambit Kyiv has again demonstrated its willingness to use military operations not to achieve strategic aims but to shape immediate perceptions and pursue political objectives. Overall, the Kursk operation has seriously reduced the likelihood of negotiations and failed to create “strategic dilemmas” capable of seriously disrupting Russia’s methodical and grinding prosecution of the war. Putin is unlikely to follow Medvedev’s call to “remove any taboo” and escalate the war. Instead, Russia will continue to pursue two goals: breaking Ukraine’s defensive lines in the Donbass and collapsing the Ukrainian power grid by the start of the winter. Ukraine may have more cards it can play to hurt Russia, but can they do anything to change the negative trajectory they are on? To create more serious chaos inside Russia Kyiv needs escalation permission. Restraint in Washington prevents this. Time will tell if this balance holds as the war enters its next stage.

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