A sobering look at another war gone wrong.
Patrick Cockburn is the author of War in the Age of Trump (Verso)
Cross-posted from Counterpunch
Photo by Margarita Marushevska
Pro-war Russian bloggers are scathing about Russia’s “Black Week” in Ukraine and are calling for mass mobilisation to stave off defeat. “Events in the direction of Kharkiv can rightfully be called a catastrophe,” writes one. “Signs of things to come were known long before. They were seen and reported on. But they do not fit into the format [of President Vladimir Putin’s Special Military Operation].”
Another critic is more specific about the shortages that contributed to the latest Russian military debacle, writing that “there are NO thermal imagers, NO bulletproof vests, NO reconnaissance equipment, NO secure communications, NOT enough copters, NO first aid kits in the army”.
Even a diatribe like this understates the crisis for Putin as he pays the price for a military campaign typified by a succession of avoidable blunders. The greatest failure took place within two or three days of Russian troops and armour invading Ukraine on 24 February. It rapidly became clear that the Ukrainian government and army would resist and Russia did not have the strength to overcome them.
Far too few soldiers
Putin’s great gamble was already doomed and he was not going to reconquer Ukraine, a land which Russia had held for most of the previous 300 years. Without it, Russia remains a powerful European state, but nowhere near recovering its status as a superpower.
The initial failure is irredeemable, but a succession of unforced errors made a bad situation far worse from the Russian point of view. Putin might have tried to recover by mobilising Russian manpower and resources, much as the Ukrainian government had done since the first days of the war. But he pretended instead that he was engaged in a limited conflict which was less than a war and full conscription was therefore unnecessary.
As a result, the Russian military has far too few soldiers to fight a long war in a country as large as Ukraine with a population of 44 million and allies prepared to supply it with weapons.
A dictator controlling information
Losses in trained manpower and equipment in the first abortive strike on Kyiv could not be replaced. Russian strategy was to engage in attritional warfare in Donbas, denuding the defences elsewhere. Michael Kofman, Russian military specialist at the CNA security think-tank, estimates that the Russians have between 80,000 and 100,000 combat troops available, ensuring that along much of the frontline they are too few to form more than a cordon sanitaire. Once this is broken, there are no reserves to plug the gap.
I am suspicious of the argument that Putin dare not risk full-scale conscription because he fears a negative popular reaction. Maybe this is the case, but he is a dictator controlling information and able to crush all opponents. More likely, he suffers from the occupational disease of autocrats, which is to be only told news which fits their preconceptions.
As a result, there were few regular Russian units around Kharkiv. Defences were manned by semi-trained militia and national guards who abandoned their tanks and heavy weapons without fighting. According to Kofman, the Ukrainian strike force was on the small side – only four or five brigades – but it swiftly sliced through the thin front line.
The attack was a surprise, despite signs that it was imminent, making it one more colossal failure by Russian military intelligence – unless they did inform the Kremlin and were ignored.
Bizarre and self-destructive
The Ukrainian military has the great advantage of operating on interior lines. The Russian army is all around them on three sides, but Ukrainian forces are in the centre and can move from the Kherson front in the south to Kharkiv in the north-east in a day or two. It would take a week or more for Russian troops to do the same, as they would have to move in an enormous semicircle back into Russia before returning to Ukraine.
Reporting from the Ukraine side has inevitably focused on their prowess and skill. Less emphasis is put on how far Ukraine has been aided by Putin’s disastrous strategy which has not only been unsuccessful but bizarre and self-destructive. After the Kremlin’s first failures, it came to believe that it could win a prolonged war because of its strength of will and superior manpower.
Had all Russian resources been thrown into the fight early on this might have been the case, as Putin’s pro-war critics now maintain. But they optimistically call for total war, wrongly supposing that the absorption of large numbers of untrained conscripts is easier than it is in practice. The Russian military simply does not have the experienced officers to train and command a newly raised mass army.
These weaknesses are for the most part self-evident, so why did the Russian general staff and officer corps not predict them? Almost certainly they did, but Putin and his inner circle paid no attention to their reservations about the Ukraine plan. It does not take long in any organisation – particularly in an autocracy where dissent and nonconformity are punished – for word to spread that it is useless or dangerous to inform those in charge about what is really going on.
A word of caution
I once asked the former Soviet charge in Baghdad, who knew the Iraqi leadership well, why none of them had told Saddam Hussein in 1990 that invading Kuwait was a disastrous idea. He replied that in the dictator’s innermost council “the only safe position is to be 10 per cent tougher than the boss”. So if Saddam Hussein asked his senior lieutenants, some of them intelligent men, if Iraqi troops should invade Kuwait, the safest course was to say: “Brilliant idea! And let’s go on and invade Saudi Arabia while we are at it.”
A word of caution here. Hubris is not the monopoly of autocrats. Premature triumphalism exacts a price, as Western political leaders should have learned in the Iraqi and Afghan wars. The Ukrainian army had close to a walkover in Kharkiv, but the same was not true of its offensive directed against Kherson where it suffered heavy casualties.
As Ukrainian forces were winning victories around Kharkiv, John Hudson from The Washington Post was interviewing Ukrainian soldiers who had been wounded in fighting near Kherson. “The soldiers said they lacked the artillery needed to dislodge Russia’s entrenched forces and described a yawning technology gap with their adversaries,” Hudson writes. “We lost five people for every one they did,” said Ihor, a 30-year-old platoon commander.”
Both Russia and Ukraine could be the losers in this war.
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