Europe has systematically destroyed its geopolitical future and now the price is to be paid,
Paweł Mościcki is a professor at the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the author of numerous books and a blog: pawelmoscicki.net
All indications are that with the beginning of Trump’s presidency, Europe is accelerating on a path that brings it closer to the Global South. But not at necessarily in a way that could be considered desirable.
The Western world already has a new emperor, as evidenced by the fact that even the staunchest defenders of the previous U.S. administration are now paying more or less overt tributes of allegiance to the new ruler. What kind of international policy will it pursue? If the authors of The Economist are to be believed, while the new president has a great talent for unpredictability (this is a commentary on his role in forcing the Gaza ceasefire on Netanyahu), he also poses a serious threat to the existing vision of world order firmly established by US hegemony. “For decades American leaders have argued that their power comes with the responsibility to be the indispensable defender of a world made more stable and benign by democracy, settled borders and universal values. Mr Trump will ditch the values and focus on amassing and exploiting power.”
Certainly one of the more irritating things surrounding this presidency – however nightmarish it may be – will be the mainstream press’s reminiscence of the old golden days, when Uncle Sam was guided by values and cared about world security. Listening to such stories after twenty years of the “war on terror” and dozens of CIA-sponsored or CIA-led coups around the world after World War II is nauseating. It is like listening to an old grandfather telling stories of his youthful love conquests for the hundredth time in front of his family, who have always known they were made up. “If Mr Trump scorns institutions like the UN, which embody universal values, China and Russia will dominate them instead, and exploit them as conduits for their own interests.” The authors of The Economist write such texts after it was the U.S. that blocked all Security Council resolutions calling for a halt to the genocide in Gaza for more than a year. Meanwhile, whatever one thinks of them, when the US did what it did, China and Russia stood on the right side of the issue. Together with the overwhelming majority of humanity represented at the UN.
In my view, Trump, as with his first term, will not change anything in substance, but he will change in decorum. Which, of course, may lead to serious reevaluations, but rather as a result of the accumulation of effects than because of causes and intentions. Looking for some kind of radical revolution in all this will only be the athletic sport of the heathens of the “good old days,” which are a total invention anyway. There has never been an America that cares about the welfare of humanity, security, and democracy. It’s just the rhetoric that successive governments in the US have used to obscure their ruthless pursuit of world domination. And today Trump will do it in a more openly, unashamed, and forceful manner than his predecessors and than he did a few years ago. Instead of the zero-style diplomacy of Anthony Blinken, who with a deadpan expression on his face repeated a recording from a 1980s neoconservative training course with complete disregard for what was going on around him, we will witness a mafia version of diplomacy, with outright threats, blackmail, and pushing partners in corners. We already have a sample of this.
What will change rather certainly – although even this is nothing entirely new, but merely an intensification of processes initiated decades ago – is Europe’s position. Everything points to the fact that it will inevitably move closer to the Global South, only in ways that are undesirable neither for its leaders nor for its more conscious opponents. The first harbingers can be seen in Trump’s provocations against Denmark, when he brazenly demanded Greenland’s secession and its passage to US custody. And it matters little whether this was a “serious” proposal or just a game calculated to achieve other consequences. It’s about transgressing a diplomatic taboo, or rather, doing in the light of the cameras what the Americans have so far done behind closed doors.
Publicly humiliating politicians it doesn’t like is a standard developed by the U.S. in its dealings with the Global South, where successive administrations have been able to almost openly arm separatist militias, support or maintain opposition politicians, and inflame ethnic, territorial or religious disputes in order to use the resulting chaos to strengthen their own hegemony. It is already apparent from Trump’s first moves that European leaders will be treated by him as the US once treated Third World representatives. Favoritism will depend on ideological affiliations (Orban) or private sympathies (Meloni), rather than stemming from some diplomatic etiquette. Even Netanyahu (not to mention Zelenski) will be no exception. According to Trump, one can dispense with idle honorifics, since everyone knows “what it’s all about” anyway: politicians of subordinate countries are to carry out the will of the sovereign or pay tributes. And preferably both.
Of course, the EU leaders have perfectly earned this status. In recent years they have done virtually nothing but ask to be included in the list of vassals, and these are treated not as equals, but according to their real power – as tools. As one does not strive for autonomy, one does not get it as a gift from a superpower that is trying to subjugate world politics anyway. So Europe is slowly moving toward the same position that the Global South has held for years in the global distribution of power. And in addition, this is happening at a time when Global South itself is raising its head, reorganizing itself and looking for alternatives to the pax americana.
Thus, four possible scenarios loom in the coming decades. The first is the development and deepening of a common front between the EU and NATO, in which Europe will become more and more directly dependent on the United States. Europeans will thus find themselves on an even keel. The more subservient they become to the US, the more they will have to strive for further American interest and presence in the region. Especially since it will be at best a terrain of suspended – and at worst: escalating – conflict with Russia. In this context, the military and political power of the US will be an increasingly existential issue for European countries, especially since most of the paths back to a relatively peaceful atmosphere have already been cut off by European politicians either in a flurry of war excitement or as a result of their chosen strategy. However, the further we descend this spiral, the less value Europe will have from the point of view of the balance of power in world politics. So the price for supporting or protecting the US will rise.
Scenario two: a kind of cold war or, in any case, an era of cooling relations begins between Europe and the US. This is possible given Trump’s overt dislike of today’s European establishment. And if this establishment somehow stays in power by stifling increasingly strong signals of backslash, this kind of more or less consistent hostility could stabilize. But since the EU’s political elite are incurable hawks on the world order issue, raised on Euro-Atlantic ideolo, they will be left alone with hardline rhetoric and obsequious hostility toward Russia or China. Moreover, they will now try to provoke the U.S. administration with it as well, probably explaining it with some “defence of values” or other legends. But this rhetoric only makes sense with an American ally behind them. Without that backing, when, for example, Uncle Sam decides that just now it is more profitable for him to get along with Russia, he will only be a laughing stock of countries that have neither the resources nor the political strength to conduct serious policy (let alone war) autonomously. And in this scenario, Europe becomes a pariah, only that it is deprived of American tutelage.
The third scenario implies the emergence of a sharp division within Europe, which is becoming increasingly likely as a result of the previous two. The issue, then, is not so much about some “third way” as a possible consequence of the previous two. In this case, centrifugal forces on the Old Continent are making it something like a new Ukraine, where countries leaning toward opposite, and still conflicted poles, are becoming increasingly distant from each other. And, as a consequence, all kinds of political, historical or regional embitterments are being revived between them, of which there are plenty in Europe and which will be increasingly easy to exploit given the weakening (if not disappearing) institutions of the EU or the administrations of individual countries. Russia with China may gain from this scenario, if they find in Europe those willing to cooperate and develop BRICS. The U.S., on the other hand, will subjugate the others with even greater ease than it has done so far.
Scenario four, the least likely. Europe maintains relative unity, but takes a course toward cooperation with the East. It turns away from the US and builds an Eurasian counterpoint to the Atlantic pole. This is a scenario that the Americans have always feared, which is why Europe’s divergence with Russia is an unquestionable geopolitical foundation for them. But in order for this scenario to become a reality in Europe, a real revolution (or counter-revolution, if you prefer) would be needed, which, in addition, would manage to stop all disciplinary efforts on the part of the US. And the apparatus of this kind of countermeasures has been built and perfected since the first post-war years. And it represents one of the primary objectives of NATO’s existence. Thus, the realization of this scenario would also mean the disintegration of “the most powerful military alliance in the world,” which would not likely take place without massive destruction. Then Europe would also enter a possible new opening with the BRICS countries from a position of subordination, without the assets and without the authority it could boast of until quite recently.
Well, okay, there is a fifth scenario, as unlikely as the previous one. Europe pours ashes over its head and funds some kind of new Bandung agreement and tries to arrange the countries of the South around it without affiliation with either the Atlantic pole or the BRICS pole. It takes responsibility for its historical faults, and apologizes for its arrogance, which was fueled by the belief in eternal protection from the US. It recognizes that the Americans were never about values – just like the affiliated Europe itself – and is now spearheading a moral and political renewal of international politics. This scenario would probably be welcomed with conviction by various internal critics of the EU, its dissidents and outsiders of the current geopolitical project. But what would that world, which Europe would invite to join, say about it then? And why should it trust it more than the BRICS, if the latter maintains its relatively horizontal and loose character, beneficial to most parties? Even then, Europe – that embodiment of all virtues and values – will walk the talk when asked. The addressees, on the other hand, may ask specifically, “what do you have to offer?” And it may then turn out to be not much at all.
From Trump’s inauguration to this vision, unpleasant in virtually every version, may be closer than we think. Either way, it is rather too late for good solutions. By about several decades.
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