The Ukraine war and the role of Europe
Colonel Markus Reisner is an Austrian historian, military expert and officer of the Austrian Armed Forces serving as superintendent of the institute for officer’s training at Theresian Military Academy
Cross-posted fron Strana
Translation by Geoffrey Roberts
– The Russian-Ukrainian war is in its fourth year. Can we say that the breaking point has been reached?
– I would say that Ukraine has already written itself into history. This is really important. I will give you a similar example: Finland in the Finnish-Soviet war and in the Second World War in general. Of course, in the end they lost part of their territory, but they showed the will to fight. I would say that the same thing has happened to Ukraine. So, whatever the outcome of this war, Ukraine has already secured its place in history.
The last three years can be compared to a boxing match. On one side is a Russian fighter, on the other is a Ukrainian one, supported by Europe. In heavy-weight boxing, there was a very famous Russian boxer – Nikolai Valuev. He was a huge guy who won his fights not due to tactical skill, but due to his weight. He lost only two fights because at the beginning [of the fight] his opponents acted very cleverly and accurately.
Ukraine did the same. Valuev got, so to speak, two “blue eyes”: he was “blinded” at the beginning. But the question is what will happen in the next “rounds”.
From the beginning, the West – especially the United States – was ready to help Ukraine, but only up to a certain limit.
You may remember what happened in October 2022, when the Americans feared the Russians might use tactical nuclear weapons. During this period, very tense negotiations were held between the Americans and the Russians, and this did not happen.
But the Russians were able to withdraw their troops from the Kherson bridgehead. Many say that these two things were not connected; however, these forces were then transferred to other parts of the front. At the same time, the Russian offensive on Bakhmut began.
At that moment, after the successes near Kharkov and Kherson, the Ukrainians were already planning a third offensive on Zaporizhia, which never took place, because all the troops were transferred to Bakhmut.
Russia gained time. In seven months, it dug in the Zaporizhia region – especially between Tokmak and the area north of Mariupol. The rest of the story is known: in 2023, the expected summer offensive of Ukraine began, but it did not bring operational success. It was not possible to cut off the supply lines to the Kherson region and Crimea, including by attacking the Kerch Bridge.
This was a key moment, after which the Ukrainians decided to go on the defensive in 2024.
In my opinion, 2024 was the culmination moment, when it was decided whether or not the Ukrainians would be able to contain Russia and form strategic reserves. What happened was that in 2024, the Russians expended more resources, and finally seized the initiative. And, of course, it is important that Russia does not fight alone. When the Russian “boxer” returns to his corner of the ring, the Chinese, Indians, North Koreans, Iranians, etc. give him some support. For example, China supplies Russia with certain electronic components for weapons. The Indians buy raw materials from it. Iran – drones and assistance in building two factories for their production. The North Koreans deliver artillery ammunition – 3 million shells last year and the same amount the year before.
The Ukrainians found themselves trapped in a war of attrition that they can only win with the help of the West. This is a very important nuance. Western assistance is the centre of gravity for the Ukrainians. Why? Because Ukraine cannot restore its forces to wage war on its own. This is often forgotten. We often focus on the tactical level, where events take place more or less on the front line. Sometimes – a little on the operational level, when we discuss, for example, Donbass in connection with the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But we often forget about the strategic level, where it is decided how long you can wage war.
Russia is already conducting a third air campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. The country’s energy minister said last year that about 80% of the critical [energy] infrastructure was either destroyed or badly damaged. This means that if Ukraine does not have functioning tank factories or something like that, as was the case in Kharkov, or huge factories, then the West must provide resources to wage war.
So, if the centre of gravity is Western aid, and if Ukraine needs it, then the West needs to understand that if it wants Ukraine to at least survive or even win the war, this aid has to come on a regular basis on a certain scale, and it is not happening yet. Why? Because in the Ukrainian corner of the ring are the Europeans with a lot of good ideas, but without the means and the real will to produce what is needed, because of course it costs a lot of money, and the Americans say: “Well, we are not so interested in boxing anymore, let’s start a wrestling competition, for example, with China.” And this is, in fact, a problem. This is why the situation is so desperate. You saw what happened in the Oval Office. And you saw that Zelensky immediately realised: “Oh, my God, we have to go back to the Americans, because there are certain resources that only they can provide us, and not the Europeans.” For example, intelligence, which has been a key topic since the beginning of the war, but if access to data is blocked, this will complicate the whole situation even more.
– Then what should be the realistic political and military goals of Kyiv in the current conditions?
– It’s always about strategy. In the case of Ukraine, from the very beginning, it was the liberation of the entire territory of the country. But if you now understand that the path of attack is impossible, because you no longer have the means, then you need to reconsider your strategic goal. If the West does not provide what is needed and if Ukraine itself cannot provide it – and this is not only about tanks, drones or artillery shells, but also about soldiers – the goals will have to be revised. The Ukrainians must at least try to convince Russia that it is better to organise some kind of ceasefire. Otherwise, Russian troops will simply continue the offensive, and then they will have to retreat to the Dnieper or something like that. Now everything will depend on what kind of pressure the Americans can put on both sides when it comes to negotiations.
– We will return to this a little later. You mentioned drones. According to statements by the Ukrainian leadership, drones are currently the main focus. Can they still compensate for the lack of soldiers and equipment on the battlefield?
– The shortage of soldiers is Ukraine’s biggest problem now. A regular battalion consists of about 500 soldiers, and in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the actual numbers of battalions fluctuates between 75 and 30% of the regular strength. A typical Ukrainian brigade must cover up to 30 km on the front line with four exhausted battalions. There is always a space between the strongholds through which Russian troops can penetrate in small units. But you can “fill” these gaps with drones and effectively fight the Russians in what we call in military affairs the “close zone”, that is, at a distance of up to 20-30 kilometres. This is why Russian units are still suffering high losses, and why we call it a “transparent battlefield”.
However, there is also an operational level, where it is decided where the next operation will be carried out, for example, with the participation of various army units. And if you have no idea what is, figuratively speaking, on the other side of the hill, if the Russians are already forming some kind of huge manoeuvre force, problems can arise. That is the value of the data provided by American intelligence. But the importance of drones is also great here. With their help, you can monitor a large part of the occupied territory.
Drones are even more important at the strategic level. Every two or three days, the Ukrainians try to strike targets on Russian territory with drones. There is an effect, but is it cumulative? It’s like in a boxing match: if you want to knock out your opponent, it’s better to hit like a machine gun. After a long series of blows, he’ll just fall. But if you hit once and wait, hit again and pause again, the opponent will recover – especially if it’s a person like Valuev.
The problem the Ukrainians face is that they strike targets in Russia, but the cumulative effect from them is not yet so great that the Russians really feel it.
At the same time, the Russians are increasingly depleting Ukrainian air defences with their daily drone launches and missile attacks every two to three weeks.
If we imagine that the US will stop or significantly reduce military aid, will Ukraine be able to hold the front and how long will the Ukrainian Armed Forces last?
– Many say: “If the Russians continue to advance at the current pace, it will take 100 years before they reach Lviv.” But this is due to a misunderstanding of the situation. This is a war of attrition. If one side suddenly runs out of resources, the situation on the battlefield can change very quickly. In one second the enemy enters your position, in another second he is already behind you, and then, lo and behold, he is already in Lviv. In my opinion, we are still not entirely honest in the West. Someone has to say: “Europeans, listen. We agreed that we would help the Ukrainians. But the 16th package of sanctions did not have the effect we had hoped for. And all those tanks and other things that we supplied did not stop the Russians. Let’s try this option now. We will take money from the funds to combat climate change and social security and start producing shells for the Ukrainians and ourselves.” However, I am not sure the people of Europe will react to this with cries of “Hurray!”
A lot of money is needed. The defense industry is all private companies that want to earn a big profit. In Russia, an artillery shell costs about 800-1200 euros. In Europe, its price is from 8 thousand to 10 thousand euros. Companies say: “We can supply, but it will be very expensive.” There is a way out. In 1915, an ammunition crisis arose in Britain. The government realised that private enterprises could not produce the required number of shells for the Western Front. Then the companies were nationalized and increased their production volumes.
– It does not seem that the current Western governments are ready for such radical steps…
– So, we need to look for money. Because on the other side of the “ring” there is a conveyor belt. In North Korea, they produce shells in three shifts, which will then end up in Ukraine. But there is nothing new in this. History is full of such examples. It does not repeat itself exactly, but always develops according to patterns. We are again seeing war fatigue in European countries. People say that it is time to find some kind of solution. They say that the Russians can be understood. But no one asks what this will mean for Ukraine? What if the Russians want to establish a demilitarized zone east of the Dnieper? Or will events unfold in such a way that Russia will receive a “land bridge” to Transnistria and that Odessa will one day be Russian? In that case, Ukraine will be a landlocked country, with limited access to resources, perhaps with a government in Lviv that the Russians will influence in hybrid ways to achieve a composition that is favourable to them. In ten years, they will get what they want. These are the things that need to be discussed.
Let’s now talk about UAF operations in the Kursk region, which, apparently, are coming to an end. How do you assess them, in whose favour did they work?
– Remember, this is a war of attrition. A very long front line – about 1,100 kilometres. The Russians are attacking in different areas to prevent the Ukrainians from forming strategic reserves for new attacks. Last year, Russia planned an operational breakthrough in the Donbass. To support it, they wanted to launch an operation in the direction of Kharkov, not to capture it, but to create such great pressure on the Ukrainians that they would be forced to withdraw their strategic or operational reserves from the Donbass to Kharkov. This would weaken the section of the front in the Donbass and lead to a breakthrough.
Russia failed to achieve serious success in the Kharkov area. Ukraine’s countermove was the Kursk operation with similar goals – to force the Russian command to transfer troops from the Donbass, which would reduce the pressure on this section of the front. And if they had managed to capture the nuclear power plant in the region, everyone would have said: “Oh, God, stop immediately, because we don’t want another Chernobyl.” And that would have given Kyiv a chance to say: “Yes, you can give it back, but we want, for example, Energodar [Zaporizhzhya NPP] in return.” Did the plan work? Partially, since the Russians used the forces prepared for the Kharkov direction for defense. However, only a few units were sent from Donbass to Kursk. And, of course, this was a big blow in psychological terms, because for the first time since the end of World War II, the enemy entered Russian territory proper.
Probably, if the operation had gone according to plan or even exceeded expectations, everyone would have said: “This will go down in history.” But it turned out differently. And what other options did the Ukrainian command have? We must take into account what was behind the planning of this operation and why it was undertaken as an act of desperation? Yes, of course, there is a big debate going on now: would it not have been better to send them there, because, as you know, in the end there was a breakthrough near Ocheretino, which began the offensive on Pokrovsk.
Okay, now about Russia. Does it have the potential for new offensive operations this year? In what areas can it conduct a spring or summer offensive?
– Politically, the Russians will try to “cultivate” Trump even more. They will say: “You are a great statesman. Yes, you are absolutely right: peace is necessary. But we need to discuss this and this, and in two weeks this.” I think the Russians are quite happy with how the situation is developing politically. Nobody expected Trump to act like this. He wants to deal with China, so let there be a stalemate peace agreement, and then the Europeans will somehow solve this problem.
In terms of war, Russia will increase pressure on the UAF. As we have already said, one of the most serious problems of the Ukrainian army is lack of soldiers, given that the front line is constantly stretching. The Russians, as my Ukrainian colleagues say, behave like water: they penetrate through any unprotected place. At some point, they may end up behind you. And the only option left is to either run away or try to retreat in an organised manner.
I wouldn’t say that Russia will launch a major offensive. But perhaps one of the goals of the Russian army could be to cross the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region to show the world that they are there. After all, most people don’t study the situation in detail. The headlines will flash “Dnipro”, and everyone will say: “Oh my God, they have already reached the regional center which means they are already on the Dnieper!”
How likely is the ceasefire in Ukraine, which is being talked about a lot now? What are the general parameters of a peaceful settlement? And when can we expect it?
– Imagine the following situation. You and I have to fight each other, using, for example, knives. Blood flows, bones break. And suddenly someone – let’s call them the police – intervenes. They separate us and say: “Either you stop immediately, or you will be punished.” In this fight between Russia and Ukraine, the only contender for the role of “policeman” is Trump. He says: “I want this to stop: enough blood.” And if you do not stop, I will do this and that. Let’s imagine that Washington still managed to force the Russians to stop. But then Trump can “turn away”, who guarantees that the war will not start again. Of course, the American president can say that he has a “young assistant”, that is, the Europeans. And will the Russians take them seriously? What happens if they try to stand next to the Ukrainians? But Russia can attack them too if the Americans don’t intercede. Right now, the Russians are saying, “We are not ready to accept the Europeans as an equal. If European troops are on Ukrainian territory, we will consider them enemies.”
The Russians want to be spoken to as equals. And that’s what Putin has already won. He got Trump to talk to him, thereby raising his status. The American president said that Putin is a world leader who can use force to achieve peace. This is a completely different rhetoric than under Obama, who said that Russia is a regional power. That was true in practice, but politically it sounded harsh. And that really hurt Moscow.
Returning to the issue of a ceasefire, it all depends on Trump, on whether he can force the Russians to agree to certain conditions. And Russia will say: yes, it was a good pass, but the ball is back in your half of the “field” because there is still a lot to discuss. We do not want Ukraine in NATO, and the demilitarized zone should extend further to the east, because we do not want Moscow to be attacked by drones and Storm Shadow missiles… And, as Putin said the other day: who can guarantee that there will be no violations? Who will monitor this? What neutral force? Let’s bring in the Chinese, whom we trust more than the British or the French. There is something that I call “the elephant in the room.” These are nuclear weapons, anti-satellite weapons and other means that Russia has. The Ukrainians have been faced with the problem from the very beginning that the Americans were ready to provide a lot, but not everything that was really needed to win the war. Because there was always this “elephant in the room.” The question remains: how will Trump force Moscow to do what it needs to do to establish peace. He once talked about tougher sanctions. We have been hearing about this for several years. Will it work as Trump hopes? Because if it doesn’t, Russia will just keep going. Why should it stop?
Lately, there has been a lot of talk in the EU that Putin might attack Europe after the war in Ukraine ends. Do you think this is a real possibility?
– On the one hand, we hear that Russia is already on the verge of collapse, that its soldiers are drunk, running away, etc. On the other hand, that it is going to attack Europe in three or ten years. Propaganda is trying to convince society both of the degradation of the potential enemy and that it might attack Europe, which means it needs to replenish the arsenals from which many weapons were sent to Ukraine. The second requires the consent of Western societies, so now they are trying to wake people up with alarming articles. For example, last year, the Financial Times published an article that said that NATO can only control 5% of the airspace of member states. So, is a Russian attack on Europe possible? I would say: who knows.
As a historian, I can tell you that the biggest problem with historians is that they create the impression that everything was clear from the very beginning. But it is never obvious. Nobody knew that after the First World War there would be a Second World War, which would be even worse. It is unlikely that the young people who returned from the battlefield wanted to end up in another one in their adulthood. Or maybe what we are seeing now in Ukraine is what we saw in Spain in 1937. Or is it Munich in 1938?
Will Russian tanks go to Central Europe after Ukraine? I would say no. Because if they did, the following would happen: the Europeans will immediately unite. They will say: “Well, of course it is true: the Russians are the aggressors.” Rather, they will continue the hybrid war in an attempt to weaken Western societies, weakening their will to fight. By proving that Russia is not so bad, it is the European leaders who are forcing us to fight against it. And the Russians do not want to fight the Europeans.
The exception is the Baltic states. Because if Russia attacked them, and suddenly Article 5 of NATO did not work, because the Europeans said they did not want to die for the Baltics, and the Americans said that this was Europe’s business, then the Alliance would simply fall apart. That is why the situation is so dangerous. Although in Ukraine everything could continue for a long time. And having reached the Dnieper, Russia would prepare to attack Transnistria.
It seems to me that if the Europeans do not give the Ukrainians some prospects, this could lead to the next government in Ukraine being pro-Russian.
You mentioned plans to rearm Europe. This has been one of the main topics in recent weeks. There is also talk about the need to minimize Europe’s dependence on US defense guarantees, up to the point of creating a European defense union instead of NATO. How realistic are all these plans?
– More and more people are speaking out in favour of producing more weapons, developing their own capacities in order to free themselves from America, etc. But, as I have already said, this costs a lot of money. Why am I returning to this again? Because we all live more or less well in Central Europe. Sometimes we have two cars, we go on vacation once a year. Now a person like me comes along and says to people: “Look, we all agreed that climate change is a problem. But there is another problem that is even worse. There may be a war in the future, perhaps with Russia, which we must avoid. We need to invest in defense. We will take the “climate” and “social” money and start producing what is needed for Ukraine and for us. And you may have to hand in your second car, and there will be no vacation this year.” How many people would agree with that?
– I think most would disagree.
– By the way, you mentioned the possible role of the United States in a potential conflict over the Baltics or Central Europe. Do you think it is a realistic scenario that the United States will leave NATO? And what will that mean for Europe?
– We are entering an era when it is difficult to make predictions. It is like predicting the future by looking into a crystal ball. And the most incredible thing is happening. At the recent Munich Security Conference, the Americans blamed the Europeans for everything. And if someone had mentioned this before, they would have been called crazy. Everyone believed that the transatlantic partnership, as the basis of European security, could not change even under Trump. And then, first, US Defense Secretary Hegseth said that the war in Ukraine must be stopped, and those who are against it are responsible for its victims. Then: Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not a topic for discussion. And the time has come for the Europeans to enter the arena. However, they should not act in Ukraine, and if something happens, it will not be covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Then Vance appeared and said: “Our enemy is not Russia or China. You are the enemy of your people.” After that, he met with Weidel [leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany], and not with Scholz. Then there was Zelensky’s meeting with Trump and Vance in the Oval Office, which no one expected to happen either.
Now is the time to start developing scenarios. A positive one is if the Europeans wake up and say: “Okay, we will take care of our defense, we will have a relationship with the Americans, perhaps more independent, but we will take care of our own security, to ensure deterrence when it comes to, for example, Russia and China. And this deterrence can be projected into the regions, as it is happening with Ukraine, so that the Ukrainians or whoever is left will not be attacked by Russia again.” Negative scenario: nothing happens, no deterrence. Putin continues. The Europeans quarrel among themselves. America will simply talk to whoever they need at the moment. This situation makes us all much weaker than before.
I agree with much of your strategic analysis, especially regarding Ukraine’s reliance on Western support. However, I don’t agree with the underlying assumption that Russia must remain the eternal enemy. That’s simply not true. As Jeffrey Sachs recently pointed out in his EU Parliament speech, we should aim for normal relations with Russi,like any neighbor would. Peace requires diplomacy and a willingness to consider each other’s security concerns.