Things are not progressing as Trump expected in the negotiations to end the Ukraine conflict
Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D., is an expert analyst at Corr Analytics, www.canalyt.com
Cross-posted from Russian & Eurasian Politics
U.S. President Donald Trump and his new and internationally inexperienced administration have been in hot pursuit of a ceasefire and peaceful resolution of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War. The pursuit has laid bare the false promise of an end to the war on the administration’s first or even one-hundredth day as previously advertised. This is no business deal. This the hardball world of international politics, national power and interests, ancient and not-so-ancient local and international resentments, grievances, betrayals, and hatreds. Despite what may seem as a disappointing complications and the inevitably longer timeline for the arrival of any prospective ceasefire or conclusive peace, significant early progress was made, and the stumbling blocs that have appeared were to be expected and can be overcome with time and the further deterioration of Ukraine’s position on the battle fronts, which is inevitable.
There has been some confusion among observers and the public regarding the process, with issues such as NATO expansion tied to a ceasefire in some minds. This is a subject for a final treaty, not a ceasefire, which is needed to allow peace talks to proceed more smoothly, niot to mention ending the bloodshed and destruction. The ceasefire agreement must not be conflated from peace treaty negotiations. A ceasefire will, therefore, take at least several, if not many months. This is not least of all because of the need to resolve what Russian President Vladimir Putin called “nuances” – organizational measures needed to implement a full-fledged ceasefire.
While agreement, violated albeit, has been achieved on a month-long ceasefire regarding energy infrastructure, the two sides are very far apart regarding any treaty. Putin’s 4 goals for Russia’s ‘special military operation (SMO) contradict directly Zelenskiy’s demands for security guarantees and the return of all territory annexed or occupied by Russia. Again, these are problems to be addressed under any peace treaty. The ceasefire must be fully implemented before any treaty can be addressed in any robust fashion.
Trust-building is desperately needed, especially between Russia and Ukraine and can develop as partial agreements are made, complied with, and yield new agreements. Recent history and a long cultural tradition of security vigilance in Russia and in part inherited by Ukraine, the apposition of Russian nationalism and more rabid Ukrainian ultras-nationalism and neofascism, and, most importantly, the exacerbating factor of outside interference in Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations by the U.S., Europe, and NATO create a matrix of distrust between all the parties, including the ostensible mediating side, the U.S., which is the lead combatant on the NATO side of the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War. The last point undermines the peace process from the start, and depending on how that process develops could end in many in Moscow, already being suspicious, coming to see the entire process as a ruse to hold off a Russian victory, viewing Trump’s America as ‘playing the good cop’, while Zelenskiy and Europe continue the war.
The ceasefire is evolving into four distinct elements — energy infrastructure, sea, air, and land ceasefires – to comprise the overall ceasefire prospectively. The full ceasefire could be achieved by mid-summer but more a more realistic target is before the end of the year. The intricacies of the technical issues will determine much of process’s duration, beyond the parties’ obstinacy, and this will give Russian forces time to advance further west towards or beynd the Dneiper River and could spark collapses of Ukraine’s defense fronts, army, Maidan regime, and state itself before any full ceasefire holds and any peace treaty or treaties are concluded. Let us take each of the four ceasefire elements in turn.
The ceasefire on Energy Infrastructure (EIM) is the most likely one to emerge and perhaps hold, if there is the will on the part of the parties to do so. It was low hanging fruit for the Trump administration to seize, since there were talks between Ukraine and Russia sponsored by Qatar in autumn about such an agreement that almost succeeded. It is in the interests of both warring sides, since it allows them to keep fighting by preserving a key resource for doing so.
According to the respective American, Russian, and Ukrainian summaries of the 23-25 March Riyadh talks, the US and Russia agreed on March 25 that the infrastructure coming under the moratorium’s jurisdiction includes: oil refineries, oil-gas storage sites and pumping stations, electricity infrastructure, atomic energy stations, and hydroelectricity dams. However, there is a possible dispute over timing: Russia’s statement on 23-25 March Riyadh states, the EIM began March 18 when Putin ordered Russian forces to implement such a moratorium after his meeting with Steven Witkoff.
Ukraine’s statement says the energy moratorium began on March 25th. However, President Putin ordered Russian troops to refrain from attacking such infrastructure immediately upon agreeing with US envoy Witkoff on such a moratorium in their Kremlin talks on March 18th. The US-Ukraine statement on 23-25 March’s results states: The United States and Ukraine agreed to develop measures for implementing President Trump’s and President Zelenskyy’s agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine. This suggests that Washington also considers the moratorium to have begun on the 25th. Between March 18-25 Kiev’s forces violated the moratorium 4 times and has done so a pair of times since. So its designation of the later date may be intended to acquit Ukraine of any violation. The Russians have given a list of Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure that took place after March 18. As is their frequent practice, the Ukrainians State Security Service (SBU) blamed an attack on the list that occurred on a key natural gas distribution center located in Russian Kursk’s ill-fated Sudzha on the Russians themselves (https://t.me/stranaua/190822). The Ukrainians have claimed at least one Russian energy ceasefire violation. But in contrast to its own violations no videos or other data have been published on this alleged Russian violation, and Ukraine has not given the U.S. any list or data regarding Russian violations. All this suggests that Moscow will withdraw or seek a re-negotiated continuation on April 17th, and then Kiev and perhaps Washington will then blame Russia for failing to continue the agreement, though subsequently all sides may come together and re-start the moratorium.
US statement Also on 23-25 March the US and Russia agreed to take all necessary measures to restore the Black Sea Initiative (BSI), colloquially called the ‘grain deal’ – that is a Black Sea ceasefire to ensure the safe transport of grain-carrying ships through the Black Sea from the Ukrainian port of Odessa. This also is somewhat low hanging fruit, since such an agreement was achieved in summer 2022. However, BSI 1.0 proved fragile. The July 2022 BSI 1.0 held for one year. The Russians refused the annual renewal in summer 2023 because: (1) suspicions weapons on returning grain transport ships; (2) the West’s violation of the agreement by failing to repeal sanctions on the use of SWIFT initiated against RosSelKhozBank (Russian Agricultural Bank) and other Russian banks servicing payment operations for Russian grain exports; and (3) deficit of exports to the Global South as compared to Europe.
After withdrawing, the Russians have not interfered in Black Sea shipping, though it quite easily could do so and even establish a full blockade if it were prepared to ignore the very same Global South that it is assiduously courting in BRICS+ and other international fora. Aside from that, the Russians would lose nothing and can gain much from BSI 2.0 if it is implemented faithfully by the Ukrainians, who can be pressured by Washington to adhere to the agreement; something that did not exist under BSI 1.0.
Moscow will also gain from an apparent part of this agreement, which stipulates that numerous sanctions will be removed against Russia upon implementation. Points 1 and 2 of both the Russian and US statements on the outcomes of the 23-25 March talks notes in regard to the BSI 2.0 agreement:
“The United States and Russia have agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea.
“The United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions.”[1]
The Russian statement, however, adds a footnote, which stipulates that Points 1 and 2 come into force after a series of sanctions on Russia are lifted, including sanctions against Russia on: implementing Russian trade and financial operations (in general!), Russian food production and export companies (including fish and fertilizer), Russian ships working for these industries and their servicing in foreign ports, and the supply of agricultural equipment and other related goods to Russia.[2] This means the Russians would have won the full removal of sanctions on its agricultural, fishery, and fertilizer industries and exports and perhaps, given the wording of the first point in the footnote, other sanctions on ‘trade and finance’.
However, as with BSI 1.0, BSI 2.0 is threatened by the Europeans who blocked Russian banks’ access to SWIFT despite BSI 1.0 and largely control SWIFT. Maritime insurance is largely centered in very anti-Russian London, and Europe will be loathe to grant Russian ships any access to its ports, obviously, for ship repairs, in particular. Indeed, the EU Commission immediately issued a statement to this effect, declaring they will not lift any sanctions until Russian troops have been withdrawn from all pre-2014 Ukrainian territory (www.politico.eu/article/eu-chief-no-backing-down-on-russia-sanctions/). French President Immanuel Macron said the same day that it is too early to lift any sanctions on Russia (www.dw.com/en/ukraine-macron-says-too-early-to-consider-lifting-russia-sanctions/live-72042398).
At the same time, the discrepancy between the American and Russian versions of the talks, with the latter specifying that the security measures under the BSI 2.0 will implemented after the agricultural sanctions against Russia are lifted, suggests a disagreement between Moscow and Washington. It should be borne in mind that US Secretary of State emphasized after the first US-Russian meeting in Riyadh that the lifting of sanctions should occur after a peace agreement, not before a ceasefire agreement.
Any ceasefires on land and in the air will be much more difficult to agree upon and implement.
A ceasefire in the air will be vexing, given Russia’s great advantage in the air and the porous barrier between what may be regarded as land and air war under the revolution in military affairs represented by drones. Are drones part of the air force. Russian drone forces are included under its joint Air and Space Forces. The NATO-Russia Ukrainian War is the first drone war, and Russia’s advantage in the quality and quantity of its drones and thus in drone warfare in general is gaining by the day. The Russian armed forces now deploy hundreds of drones per day across all of Ukraine and more and more frequently do so in swarms targeting a single object. Moscow will be giving up perhaps its greatest advantage should it participate in a moratorium on drone warfare under a general air ceasefire. Indeed, Ukraine will gain by any moratorium on air warfare, given Russian superiority in jet fighters and attack helicopters, no less that involving drones.
A ceasefire on the ground will be no less vexing to achieve. Ceasefire along the line of contact will freeze a conditional border that does not correspond to the territories annexed by Russia. This will create a need to trade unoccupied annexed areas for occupied unannexed areas. The still unoccupied areas of the four Ukrainian regions Russia has claimed besides Crimea – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporozhe, and Kherson – can be traded as part of any final peace agreement. Russian-occupied areas that Moscow has not claimed or annexed are located in Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernigov, and soon Dnipro regions. Part or all of Poltava will be taken if the Russians reach Dnieper. The strategic port city of Odessa and Mikolaev oblast are also under threat. This problem of territories claimed by the other side may explain, for example, why as Ukrainian forces are being pushed out of Kursk, they are attacking Belgorod and Bryansk in Russia. Kiev needs new bargaining chips not made of Ukrainian lands.
Enforcing the ceasefire presents a host of other complications. Ukraine’s neofascist groups violated with violence the Russo-European brokered agreement between the Maidan protests’ representatives and President Yanukovych of 20 February agreement, overthrowing the legitimately elected president even after US President Barak Obama told Putin in a phone call that he supported the agreement. The Neofascist units incorporated into the army and National Guard repeatedly violated the Minsk agreements’ ceasefires repeatedly, including massive violations on the eve of Putin’s SMO decision. Neofascist units such as the Azov Battalion – recently upgraded to Army Corps status – also operate drones, giving them a method perhaps less easily tracked for violating a ceasefire agreement they undoubtedly will oppose in great majority. Azov and other fascist-dominated units, such as the Right Sector-affiliated Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, are likely poorly controlled by the civilian leadership, if not top military command. If Kiev tries to withdraw extremist units from contact line under any new ceasefire, they could turn their guns on Kiev, carry out terrorist operations against both the Maidan regime and the Russians as well as engage in criminal activity.
The return of an OSCE Monitoring Mission to Ukraine after its limited success during the Minsk ceasefires, and the fact that the OSCE took NATO’s side in the war renders such a mission a dubious proposition for Moscow. Certainly, Moscow will not tolerate any European forces as peacekeepers, which will have to be brought in from countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, perhaps Brazil.
Trump has levers to push the parties towards peace. For the Ukrainians, he can withhold intelligence and weapons supplies. For the Russians he can delay or threaten to forego rapprochement or various aspects of it: sanctions relief, trade agreements, and renewed cooperation regarding the world’s various conflicts. Pres. Trump’s “Liberation Day” 20 percent tariff on EU goods might be adjusted depending on Brussels’ compliance with American wishes for sanctions relief for Russia. Otherwise, the EU is positioned to scuttle BSI 2.0. Indeed, Russia’s 10 percent tariffs and 0 percent on Russia can be adjusted depending on where pressure needs to be applied.
In sum, there are a host of problems that will take months of concerted effective diplomacy led by the U.S. as things stand now. But the Trump administration is short of seasoned diplomats and experienced foreign and security policy experts. We have a long, hard way to go before peace reigns in Ukraine.
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