Bogged down in Gaza, repulsed in Lebanon, Netanyahu has already started to shift Trump’s attention to the need to attack Iran
David Hearst is co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He is a commentator and speaker on the region and analyst on Saudi Arabia. He was the Guardian’s foreign leader writer, and was correspondent in Russia, Europe, and Belfast. He joined the Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.
Cross-posted from Middle East Eye
When Hezbollah’s late secretary general, Hasan Nasrallah, was killed by 10 bunker-busting bombs dropped on a bunker 60 feet below ground, there was jubilation on the streets of Israel.
“Oh Nasrallah, we’ll take you down, God willing, and send you back to God along with all of Hezbollah,” were the lyrics of a song blasted from one apartment building in Tel Aviv.
A lifeguard announced to swimmers: “With happiness, joy and cheer, we announce officially that the rat Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated yesterday. The people of Israel live.” And in common with received wisdom at the time, The Spectator proclaimed: “Nasrallah is dead and Hezbollah is broken.”
Only two months later, the mood in Israel is very different. Just 11 days ago, the defence minister, Israel Katz, said that the goal was to disarm Hezbollah and create a buffer zone in south Lebanon.
The army secured neither and the Israelis knew it.
Asked in a poll who won after nearly 14 months of fighting, 20 percent of the Israelis polled said they believe Israel to have won while 19 percent said Hezbollah did. Fifty percent of people said that the fighting was set to end without a clear victor, while 11 percent said they didn’t know.
The operation that killed Nasrallah was named: “New Order“. And to establish a narrative of victory, the myth persists today that Hezbollah has been “battered and diminished” by 13 months of war. Weakened and isolated, it was desperate for a ceasefire, the New York Times confidently opined.
Lethal leaks
Hezbollah’s first and second ranks of leaders have indeed been decimated. The booby trapped pagers and walkie talkies were devastating, but only to the people issued with them, who were administrative and political functionaries. Pagers were not used by fighters.
The biggest knock to the confidence of the organisation was the intelligence leak that killed Nasrallah’s presumed successor, Hashem Safieddine, in a powerful Israeli strike on a secret subterranean Hezbollah base on 3 October.
Safieddine is believed to have been killed within minutes of arriving at a meeting of Hezbollah’s shura council. The strike was so powerful it demolished four large residential buildings.
And theories as to how Israeli military intelligence could have achieved this penetration continue to bounce back and forth between Lebanon and Iran, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Is there a mole, at the level of a general, in the IRGC?
Exactly who knew on which floor of an IRGC guesthouse Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, and his bodyguard were sleeping, and when they would go to bed? Haniyeh had guests until he went to bed at 3am.
We know the CIA has trained thousands of the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) fighters in Albania, but even so how did Israel get this very specific time-sensitive intelligence?
Has the US got the technical capability to bug what were once considered highly secure communications between Beirut and south Lebanon remotely?
No one yet knows.
A similar investigation is being conducted in Syria. And this counter-intelligence manhunt has undoubtedly created a hiatus in command and control.
But there is one fact that cannot be explained away easily by Israeli and US military briefers. How did Hezbollah keep control of the battlefield without having a functional command operating out of its headquarters in Dahiyeh, Beirut?
It is indisputable that this allegedly “weakened and debilitated” Hezbollah has put up a much stronger fight than either 1982, when Israelis soldiers took only five days to reach Beirut, or 2006.
Most potent weapon
Instead of creating a buffer zone, the invading Israeli force spent two months bogged down on the border, unable to penetrate or hold positions more than four kilometres inside Lebanon and having to stage frequent retreats. This, despite staging a blitzkrieg in the towns and cities across Lebanon.
Israeli elite units, like the Golani Brigade, have taken a hammering, losing at least 110 deaths in combat since 7 October, 2023. From the day they crossed the border, they were ensnared in premeditated traps.
In one engagement, a Golani scouting unit walked into a Hezbollah “fortress” resulting in the death of one soldier, serious injuries to a company commander and light injuries to the brigade’s chief of staff. Reservists had to be withdrawn from the fight totally.
Anyone who knows how Hezbollah trains could have told you why this should come as no surprise. Each unit is prepared and stocked to fight on its own for two years. They communicate and coordinate with each other over fibre optic cable.
The preparation is as much mental as physical, with battlefield commanders selected after six years of training in philosophy, according to one source granted rare access to them.
They think long term. They fight a war of attrition which is planned to run for decades, not weeks or months. But their most potent weapon is one that their enemy can never possess, despite an overwhelming technological advantage. It’s their social base. They are from and of the villages and towns they defend.
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